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INCENTIVIZED TORTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
J. Shahar Dillbary, Cherie Metcalf & Brock Stoddard 
ABSTRACT—Courts and scholars assume that group causation theories deter 
wrongdoers. This Article empirically tests, and rejects, this assumption, 
using a series of incentivized laboratory experiments. Contrary to common 
belief and theory, data from over 200 subjects show that group liability can 
encourage tortious behavior and incentivize individuals to act with as many 
tortfeasors as possible. We find that subjects can be just as likely to commit 
a tort under a liability regime as they would be when facing no tort liability. 
Group liability can also incentivize a tort by making subjects perceive it as 
fairer to victims and society. These findings are consistent across a series of 
robustness checks, including both regression analyses and nonparametric 
tests. 
We also test courts’ and scholars’ insistence that the but-for test fails in 
cases subject to group causation. We use a novel experimental design that 
allows us to test whether, and to what extent, each individual’s decision to 
engage in a tortious activity is influenced by the decisions of others. 
Upending conventional belief, we find strong evidence that the but-for test 
operates in group causation settings (e.g., concurrent causes). Moreover, 
across our experiments, subjects’ reliance on but-for causation produced the 
very tort that group liability attempted to discourage. 
A major function of liability in torts, criminal law, and other areas of 
the law is to deter actors from engaging in socially undesirable activities. 
The same is said about doctrines that result in group liability. Our empirical 
results challenge this basic logic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article undertakes to test two facially appealing, though 
empirically unsupported, assertions that courts and scholars accept and rely 
upon. 
The first assertion is that group liability deters tortious behavior. Courts 
impose such liability using theories such as concerted action, substantial 
factor, and alternative liability.1 The second assertion is that in cases subject 
 
 1 Under concerted-action theory, a number of parties can be held liable if they acted tortiously 
pursuant to an agreement “or to accomplish a particular result.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 
cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1979). Even absent an agreement, a group of careless actors may be held liable under 
the substantial-factor doctrine if their independent careless behaviors concurred and each substantially 
contributed to the victim’s harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
Alternative liability allows courts to hold liable careless parties who did not injure the victim if the identity 
of the injurer is unknown. It does so by shifting the burden of proof to each actor to establish that she did 
not cause the victim’s harm. Id. § 433B(3); see also infra notes 47, 1820 and accompanying text 
(discussing group-liability doctrines). 
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to group causation theories, the but-for test is inapplicable.2 For example, 
based on a belief in its ability to discourage antisocial behavior,3 courts hold 
liable all participants to a drag race, including non-injuring drivers and 
spectators. 4  Similarly, courts have imposed liability on all actors who 
carelessly set fires, although each fire alone could have destroyed the 
victim’s property.5 They have also imposed liability on a group of hunters 
who independently shot in the plaintiff’s direction, although it was clear that 
only one of them injured the victim.6 The logic of these cases extends beyond 
their particular facts to many settings involving multiple actors.7 
 
 2 See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 69597 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, 
J.) (explaining that in concerted-action, concurrent-forces, and alternative-liability cases, “the 
requirement of proving [actual] causation is relaxed”); see also infra notes 311. 
 3 The leading example is Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 1–3 (Cal. 1948), which held jointly and 
severally liable two hunters who carelessly shot in the direction of the plaintiff although it was clear that 
only one of them hit him. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, DOBBS’ LAW OF 
TORTS § 193 (2d ed. 2020) (“The leading case in the United States is Summers v. Tice . . . .”); David A. 
Fischer, Products Liability—An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1629, 1633 
(1981) (noting that, in cases like Summers, “each defendant’s conduct was unquestionably of an antisocial 
nature” and arguing that “the law seeks to . . . discourage socially undesirable activity”). 
 4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. a, illus. 2 & cmt. d, illus. 4 (AM. L. INST. 1979); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 15 cmt. a, illus. 1 (AM. L. INST. 2000); 
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, § 435 (explaining that in illegal drag races, all drivers “are jointly and 
severally liable to the plaintiff, although only one of them actually made contact with the plaintiff’s car”); 
see also Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 176 n.19 (Mich. 1984) (explaining that concerted-
action theory “seems to have developed to deter hazardous group behavior”), superseded by statute, 
1995 Mich. Pub. Acts 97, 102–03 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6304 (1996)).  
 5 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, § 189 (“In the example of the two fires that combine to burn the 
plaintiff’s property, the substantial factor test allows courts to avoid but-for analysis and to hold that the 
two tortfeasors who set the two different fires are both causes of the plaintiff’s harm, provided only that 
each fire was sufficient standing alone to cause the same harm.”); Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & 
S.S.M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 49 (Minn. 1920); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. L. 
INST. 1965) (stating the substantial-factor test); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL 
& EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“Imposing liability in such a circumstance serves 
the policy of deterrence.”); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, § 189 (referring to the two-fire hypothetical as 
the “classic example” of a case in which but-for causation fails and courts substitute the substantial-factor 
test); W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42 (5th ed. 1984) (using Anderson as an example of the substantial-factor test); 
Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Tex. 1952) (applying the substantial-
factor test in a case of multiple polluters). 
 6 Summers, 199 P.2d at 1–3; see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 4, § 193 (referring to Summers as the 
“leading case in the United States” on alternative causation); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation 
and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 494 (1980) (justifying the imposition 
of group liability in Summers and noting that “[t]o do otherwise would inappropriately weaken the 
incentive of injurers to avoid harm”); Fischer, supra note 3, at 1629, 1633 (noting the role of the law in 
discouraging certain behaviors and arguing that Summers is a “perfect example” of a case involving moral 
blame for antisocial conduct). 
 7 See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 175 (2000) (discussing the alternative-liability 
doctrine and noting that “the practical effect of the rule is to impose . . . liability upon each defendant in 
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Leading scholars also justify the application of group liability on 
theoretical grounds. For example, Professor Steven Shavell and Judge 
Richard Posner each explain that, absent group causation theories like 
alternative liability and concerted action, “the incentive of injurers to avoid 
harm[ing]” others would be “inappropriately weaken[ed].” 8  Similarly, 
Professors Mark Grady, Saul Levmore, and Daryl Levinson each laud the 
ability of “collective sanctions” to deter group members from engaging in 
wrongdoing.9 
This Article first undertakes to test the theoretical assertion that group 
liability deters actors. Courts and scholars accept and rely on this assertion—
perhaps because of its intuitive appeal—despite the lack of empirical 
support. The Article also tests the claim that the but-for test fails when group 
liability applies. Courts and scholars alike insist that “a literal and simple 
version of the but-for test” will exempt from liability the spectators in the 
drag race, the actors who carelessly set the fires, and the hunters in Summers 
v. Tice.10 The claim is that none of these actors are necessary and thus none 
can be a but-for cause of the harm.11 
Despite their widespread acceptance, the two claims—that group 
liability deters and that the but-for test fails in such settings—have never 
been tested. To date, they are based on conjecture and belief. This Article 
empirically tests these claims, using a novel series of incentivized laboratory 
 
the numerous cases in which one defendant cannot show that the other defendant was the cause” 
(emphasis added)). 
 8 Shavell, supra note 6, at 494; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 212 (9th ed. 
2014) (explaining that deterrence would be reduced without such theories); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 108, 164–67 (1987) (discussing the economics of causation and the use of 
liability to induce “optimal behavior”).  
 9 Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 913 (1994) 
(explaining that “defendants would have too little incentive to use precaution” without a theory such as 
res ipsa loquitur); Saul Levmore, Gomorrah to Ybarra and More: Overextraction and the Puzzle of 
Immoderate Group Liability, 81 VA. L. REV. 1561, 1563–64 (1995) (discussing res ipsa and justifying 
overextraction that may enhance deterrence); Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
345, 350 (2003) (justifying the application of collective sanctions on the grounds that they can 
“effectively deter wrongdoing”).  
 10 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, § 189 (taking the traditional view that “[w]hen each of two or more 
causes would be sufficient, standing alone, to cause the plaintiff’s harm, a literal and simple version of 
the but-for test holds that neither defendant’s act is a cause of the harm” and noting that “[t]he classic 
example is the case of two fires being swept by winds towards the plaintiff’s property”); see supra note 
6 and accompanying text; KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 42.  
 11 In other words, the claim is that the injury would have occurred regardless of such actors. See, e.g., 
Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 69597 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “[i]n 
all these cases the requirement of proving [actual] causation is relaxed because otherwise there would be 
a wrong and an injury but no remedy”). 
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experiments. Similar to other concurrent-cause cases,12 in our experiments, 
each subject alone could cause the victim’s harm. To ensure the robustness 
of our results, we used two framings: a “Context-Free,” or “neutral,” frame 
and a contextualized variant, or a “Vignette,” involving polluting factories.13 
In each framing, four out of every five subjects chose independently and 
simultaneously between a harmless activity with low payoffs and a tortious 
activity that promised higher gains. The payoffs of the fifth subject, the 
victim, were reduced to zero if at least one of the other four subjects chose 
the tortious activity. 
Those who chose the tortious activity were subject to one of two 
liability regimes. In the No Liability regime, behaving tortiously came at no 
(monetary) cost to the tortfeasor. Accordingly, each subject had a dominant 
strategy to behave tortiously. Under the Liability regime, the tortfeasors had 
to fully compensate the victim in equal shares. Because the expected liability 
of each tortfeasor was diluted as more joined the activity, the payoffs 
depended on the decisions of others. Specifically, acting tortiously alone or 
with one other tortfeasor promised a loss. By contrast, when acting together 
with two or more tortfeasors, the expected liability of each was diluted to the 
point each could expect a gain. Importantly, subjects had to decide whether 
to join the tortious activity without knowing what others would choose.  
Our novel experimental design allowed us to observe each subject’s 
preferences. We did so by employing the Strategy Method. This method 
allowed us to observe whether a subject’s willingness to act tortiously was 
conditional upon others doing the same. For example, we could observe 
whether a subject was willing to act only if two other actors joined her. The 
method also allowed us to check whether, despite not knowing others’ 
decisions, she was nevertheless willing to take a leap of faith and act 
tortiously.14 
Contrary to common belief, data from over 200 subjects show that 
group liability can encourage tortious behaviors. In our experiments, the 
majority of subjects preferred to act tortiously, but only if they were joined 
by others. Moreover, their willingness to engage in the tortious activities 
increased with the number of tortfeasors. In the neutrally framed experiment 
with liability, very few subjects were willing to act alone or with only one 
 
 12 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 13 This contextualized Vignette allowed us to test for the effects of group liability in a more realistic 
setting. The Vignette is described in Example 1 below. See infra Section I.A; see also infra Section II.B 
(discussing the experimental design); infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (explaining the difference 
in the treatments’ contextual framing and potential changes in behavior elicited by contextualized 
instructions in economics experiments). 
 14 See infra Section II.B.4 (explaining the use of the Strategy Method to elicit subjects’ conditional 
and unconditional preferences). 
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additional actor. However, conditional upon two other subjects joining the 
tortious activity—when the activity became profitable—the proportions of 
subjects willing to act increased to 92%. Conditional on three others acting, 
it reached 96%. In other words, despite the imposition of liability, almost 
everyone was willing to engage in the tortious activity provided a large 
enough number of actors would do the same. The result in the contextualized 
framing (i.e., the polluting-factories setting) followed the same pattern. 
Moreover, we found that in certain situations, subjects were more willing to 
act tortiously under a Liability regime compared to a No Liability regime. 
The proportion of subjects willing to act conditional on two or three other 
subjects acting was higher under the Liability regime compared to the No 
Liability regime. 
Subjects’ unconditional decisions were also surprising. Although most 
subjects preferred to act tortiously only as part of a group, the vast majority 
decided to behave tortiously unconditionally. They did so despite the fact 
that they could not communicate with each other. This suggests that subjects 
not only were encouraged to behave tortiously, but they also acted as if they 
believed that others would also be enticed by the imposition of group 
liability. 
Further, upending conventional belief, the data also provide 
overwhelming evidence supporting the claim that the but-for test can be 
operable in group causation theories like substantial factor. In all of the 
liability sessions, regardless of framing, many subjects were unwilling to 
engage in the tortious activity but for at least two other subjects doing the 
same. 
In our experiments, group liability seemed to impact subjects’ cost–
benefit calculus in a number of ways. First, as the number of subjects 
increased, the amount each could expect to pay decreased because liability 
was shared by all. Consequently, the financial gain from the tortious activity 
increased. In other words, with more tortfeasors, each tortfeasor stood to 
profit more. Second, not only did individual profits increase with the number 
of tortfeasors, social gains could have increased in the same way. Thus, 
subjects may justify the tortious activity (e.g., pollution due to production of 
cement) as a necessary evil: the sacrifice of one (who is fully compensated) 
for the benefit of many. Group liability may have also reduced the 
psychological—that is, nonmonetary—cost associated with the tortious 
activity. Under the Liability regime, the victim was compensated, which may 
have reduced actors’ moral hesitation or psychic cost from harming another. 
Additionally, we observed that in the Liability regime, subjects’ reported 
fairness levels increased monotonically with the number of actors. In other 
115:1337 (2021) Incentivized Torts 
1343 
words, the more tortfeasors joined the activity, the more just it was 
considered: to the actors, the victim, and society. 
This Article contributes to the economic and empirical research on tort 
law in a number of important ways. First, to our knowledge, this Article is 
the first to test the effect of group causation theories on actors’ behavior in 
a novel experimental setting. Previous studies have focused on the effect of 
tort law generally on actors’ decisions to engage in tortious activities but, 
due to design limitations, could not focus directly on the effect of causation 
law. 15  Second, with few exceptions, earlier studies focused on a single 
tortfeasor. They could not therefore analyze the effect of causation law on 
torts involving multiple actors. Third, our study employs a unique design that 
allows us to observe actors’ causal decisions at the individual level. Fourth, 
unlike previous studies, we also test whether and to what extent an 
individual’s decision to engage in a tortious activity is influenced by the 
decisions of others.  
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the 
theory and is divided into two Sections. The first focuses on the conditions 
and mechanisms under which liability may encourage the commission of 
torts with multiple actors. The second centers on the actual-causation 
requirement and the applicability of the but-for test in cases involving 
multiple actors. Part II reviews the relevant empirical literature, describes the 
experimental design, presents the testable hypotheses and the theoretical 
predictions, and summarizes the results. The Article then provides 
concluding remarks. Our findings raise concerns about the desirability of 
group liability as a deterrent and call for caution in its application. Group 
liability may increase both the willingness to engage in the tortious activity 
and the level of perceived fairness to the actors, the victim, and society. Our 
findings also suggest that the but-for test can function, and even play an 
important role, in cases subject to group liability. 16  Indeed, in our 
experiments, subjects were not willing to engage in the tortious activity but 
for others joining them, suggesting that each actor may have been the 
marginal but-for cause of the victim’s harm. 
 
 15 Prior literature and its limitations are discussed in Section II.A. 
 16  Contra RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 
reporters’ note, cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“There is near-universal recognition of the inappropriateness 
of the but-for standard for factual causation when multiple sufficient causes exist.”). 
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I. THE THEORY 
A. Group Liability and Incentivized Torts 
A major insight of the economic account of tort law is its role as a 
deterrent.17 By imposing appropriate costs on injurers, tort law incentivizes 
them to take care and avoid harming others.18 Economic accounts of tort law 
also contemplate that actors with private information may decide to commit 
torts when the benefits exceed the costs of liability. 19  Courts and 
commentators have generally focused on the deterrence rationale in 
extending group liability, while largely ignoring the possibility that tort law 
can incentivize rather than deter some tortious activity.20 We use a stylized 
example below to illustrate how this second consequence from tort law can 
arise and demonstrate its link to causation in group torts. 
In some cases, imposing liability on a group of wrongdoers can produce 
a dilution effect that can incentivize actors to join in committing a 
wrongdoing—a “tortfest” dynamic.21 As illustrated in our example below, in 
 
 17 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 8, at 212 (“[I]t would be an economic mistake to let both [negligent 
parties] off scot-free, as that would reduce deterrence.”); MICHAEL FAURE, TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS, 
at xxiv–xxvi, 84–85 (2009) (discussing the historical development of economic analysis of tort law and 
the focus on “economic efficiency of preventive measures”); SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 5–32, 108 
(considering how the scope of liability affects the behavior of parties); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD 
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 229 (1987) (“If the purpose of tort law is to 
promote economic efficiency, a defendant’s conduct will be deemed the cause of an injury when making 
him liable for the consequences of the injury will promote an efficient allocation of resources to safety 
and care.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic 
Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 521 (1980) (“[I]n the absence of any liability rules victims would bear 
the full costs of the accident.”). 
 18 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2627, 
68 (1970) (explaining that “the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of 
accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents” and noting that “the primary way in which a society may 
seek to reduce accident costs is to discourage activities that are ‘accident prone’ and substitute safer 
activities as well as safer ways of engaging in the same activities”); SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 108, 164–
67 (discussing how liability in tort law incentivizes due care in cases where multiple injurers are 
involved); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 3233 (1972) (arguing that 
“the dominant function of the fault system is to generate rules of liability that if followed will bring about, 
at least approximately, the efficientthe cost-justifiedlevel of accidents and safety”). 
 19 See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 17–27, 43–51 
(3d ed. 2003). 
 20 See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 371 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) 
(explaining that group liability is “need[ed] to deter hazardous behavior by groups or multiple defendants 
as well as by individuals”); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 176 n.19 (Mich. 1984) (explaining 
that concerted action “seems to have developed to deter hazardous group behavior”); Lyons v. Premo 
Pharm. Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185, 190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (“The purpose of [the concert-of-
action] theory is . . . to deter anti-social behavior.”). 
 21 J. Shahar Dillbary, Tortfest, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 978 (2013). 
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some cases, group liability may not only lead to the tort being profitable to 
the tortfeasors, it may also be welfare-enhancing, and more so when the 
social value from committing the tort increases with the number of 
tortfeasors. 
 
Example 1. Several actors (e.g., Factories) must choose between two 
activities: (1) a harmless activity (e.g., producing limestone) or (2) an 
alternative tortious activity (e.g., producing cement—a necessary 
ingredient for construction—that causes pollution). The harmless 
activity promises a $24 benefit for each actor, whereas the alternative 
activity promises $35. However, if one or more actors engage in the 
alternative activity, an innocent victim will incur an expected harm of 
$24. The alternative activity can trigger liability, shared equally by all 
participants in the tortious activity.22 
 
Standard rational-choice theory predicts that if only one or two actors 
are expected to choose the tortious activity, actors will engage in the 
harmless activity. In the case of one actor, the decision whether to engage in 
the harmless activity or the alternative activity is easy. Engaging in the 
harmless activity promises an expected gain of $24. By contrast, the 
alternative activity promises only $11, the difference between the $35 
expected benefit and the $24 expected liability. 
With two actors, the incentive to engage in the harmless activity 
remains strong. If both parties pursue the alternative activity, both will be 
held liable using a group causation theory. For example, in the case of 
polluting factories, courts may apply the substantial-factor doctrine.23 If the 
actors are participants (drivers or spectators) in a drag race during which one 
of the drivers injured the victim, both would be considered as acting in 
concert.24 And in the case of careless hunters where only one injured the 
victim, both would be liable under a theory of alternative liability.25 As a 
result, each actor can expect to pay half of the victim’s damages, $12 (24/2), 
and therefore receive a gain of $23 (35 – 12).26 They would thus prefer the 
harmless activity (24 > 23). 
 
 22 For simplicity, this example assumes that taking care is impossible or too costly. 
 23 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
 24 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 25 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 26  With some simplifying assumptions, such as solvency, it is easy to show that the result is 
independent of the apportionment regime (e.g., several liability or joint and several liability, with or 
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However, once three actors are expected to participate, engaging in the 
alternative and harmful activity becomes a winning strategy: it promises each 
actor more profit than the harmless activity. If all three engage in the 
alternative activity, all would be held liable with the aid of a group causation 
theory. As a result, the expected liability of each will be diluted to $8 (24/3). 
This means that each of the three tortfeasors can expect to gain $27 
(35 – 8)—more than the $24 gain promised by the harmless activity.27 Our 
example illustrates another point: the tortious activity can become more 
profitable and enticing as more actors join the activity if the expected liability 
decreases with the number of actors.28 
B. Actual Causation 
Example 1 also illustrates the challenge to the consensus that, in group-
liability settings (e.g., concerted action), the actual-causation requirement is 
missing.29 In fact, the example proves the consensus wrong. First, consider 
cases involving concurring causes like polluting factories—the subject of our 
Vignette. The traditional argument is that no one factory can be a but-for 
reason for the victim’s harm because the harm would have materialized in 
 
without contribution). See J. Shahar Dillbary, Apportioning Liability Behind a Veil of Uncertainty, 
62 HASTINGS L.J. 1729, 1757–58 (2011).  
 27 For example, with four actors, each can expect to gain $29 (35 – (24/4)); with ten actors, the 
expected gain increases to $32.60 (35 – (24/10)). Note that in Example 1, the tortfeasor’s and society’s 
interests are aligned. With one or two participants, the tort is welfare decreasing. It would generate at 
most a net benefit of $46—the difference between the $70 (35 • 2) benefit to the tortfeasors and the $24 
cost to the victim. By contrast, with three (or more) actors, the tortious activity becomes socially desirable. 
It would generate a net benefit of $81 ((35 • 3) – 24) compared to a net gain of only $72 (24 • 3) from the 
harmless activity. Of course, the social acceptability of a tort may change with the nature of the activity. 
It is possible that even if many agree that a harmful activity, like producing cement, is justified, fewer 
would agree that the same is true for hunting, and fewer, if any, would defend injurious drag races in the 
name of efficiency. 
 28 The model assumes that the parties know that the tortious activity (e.g., pollution) is subject to 
liability and that they are able to engage in an ex ante cost–benefit analysis. Importantly, the model does 
not assume that parties (or courts) are omniscient. Rather, it relies on the fact that they are not. Each actor 
is assumed to know her expected benefits from the activity (but not others’ benefits or decisions) and to 
estimate the harm. Moreover, the model is not limited to situations, like Example 1, where damage is 
constant. There are important examples of indivisible harms that can be produced by concurrent causes, 
such as injuries to individuals from malpractice involving medical teams or personal injuries arising from 
multivehicle accidents. However, in many cases, the actual harm and the probability of harm may increase 
with the number of tortfeasors. It remains possible to show that under certain conditions, a tortfest can 
still occur when the expected harm increases with the number of actors (i.e., there is an increase in the 
benefit from the activity that is sufficiently greater than the increase in (diluted) liability from the 
increased harm). Finally, it is not claimed that tortfests are always welfare enhancing (they are not). See 
Dillbary, supra note 21, at 995. 
 29 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
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any case because of the other factories. 30  Example 1 shows why this 
argument is faulty. One or two factories acting together would engage in the 
harmless activity, as liability makes the tortious activity less profitable. 
However, the same two factories will switch to the tortious alternative 
activity if joined by a third factory. Each factory’s tortious behavior is, 
therefore, a but-for cause of the harm because no factory would have 
engaged in the tortious activity of producing cement without the third, and 
the victim would not be injured as a result.31 
Example 1 also illustrates that a non-injuring party can be a but-for 
cause of the harm. For example, assume that the alternative activity is drag 
racing involving two drivers and a spectator—the classic example in 
concerted-action cases.32 As with the factories, neither one of the drivers 
would participate in the race unless joined by the two other actors. This is 
because a group causation theory like concerted action would hold liable the 
injuring driver and the non-injuring parties (the spectator and the driver who 
did not hit the victim).33 As with the factories example, it is only once there 
are three participants in the tortious activity that it becomes the profitable 
choice for any of them. As a result, each of the non-injuring actors (the non-
injuring driver and the spectator) is a but-for cause of the harm because but 
for their decision to engage in the tortious activity, the actor who physically 
 
 30 See DOBBS, supra note 7, § 171 (discussing the two-fire examples and noting that substantial factor 
has also been extended to cases where each of multiple polluters contributed to the victim’s harm); 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 41 (arguing that the but-for test “fails” when multiple sufficient forces 
concur to bring about the harm); see also supra note 5. 
 31 The conduct of each actor can be considered a but-for cause of the harm even when four or more 
actors engage in the activity. For an in-depth discussion, see generally J. Shahar Dillbary, Causation 
Actually, 51 GA. L. REV. 1, 34–39 (2016), which shows that in many cases involving multiple actors, each 
can be a but-for reason for the victim’s harm, and providing policy justifications for applying a but-for 
presumption in other cases.  
 32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. a, illus. 2 & cmt. d, illus. 4 (AM. L. INST. 1979); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 15 cmt. a, illus. 1 (AM. L. INST. 2000); 
DOBBS, supra note 7, § 340; Senart v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 597 F. Supp. 502, 505 (D. Minn. 1984) 
(“[T]he classic example of a concert of action case involves drag racing.”). For decisions imposing 
liability on non-injuring parties to a drag race, see Hood v. Evans, 126 S.E.2d 898, 899900 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1962); Sloan v. Fauque, 784 P.2d 895, 89697 (Mont. 1989); Sparks v. Ala. Power Co., 679 So. 2d 678, 
679, 686 (Ala. 1996); Hathaway v. Eastman, 968 N.Y.S.2d 841, 845 (Sup. Ct. 2013). 
 33 See, e.g., Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., No. 71981, 1985 Mich. App. LEXIS 3192, at *5 
(Jan. 4, 1985) (“Even if defendant caused no harm himself, he is liable for the harm caused by his fellows 
because all acted jointly.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1979) (noting 
that an actor who provided encouragement or assistance is considered a tortfeasor and is responsible for 
the resulting harm). 
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injured the victim would not engage in the tortious activity either, and the 
victim would not be harmed.34 
While there is theoretical potential for group liability to incentivize torts 
because of its dilutive effect, our example makes it clear that this depends on 
what actors believe and choose in this liability environment. If they expect 
others to be deterred, then choosing the harmless activity is best. If they 
believe that the latent cost-dilution incentive will lead enough actors to 
commit the tort, then that becomes the best choice. There are thus two 
possible equilibria: deterrence or encouragement of the harmful activity. To 
date, a deterrent effect of group liability has simply been assumed.35 
II. THE EXPERIMENT 
This Article’s goal is to empirically test how subjects behave in 
situations like Example 1. More specifically, our goal is to test whether:  
(1) imposing liability with the aid of group causation theories encourages 
actors to unconditionally engage in tortious activities instead of deterring 
them; (2) imposing liability may result in a tortfest dynamic (i.e., more actors 
would be willing to commit a tort as the number of actors increases); (3) the 
but-for test applies in settings like concurrent causes where courts insist it 
does not;36 (4) the nature of the activity and perceptions of its social value 
(e.g., producing a social good versus harming someone to get only a personal 
benefit) may impact willingness to engage in tortious activity; and  
(5) perceptions of fairness may change with the number of actors (e.g., a 
tortious activity may be considered more equitable if conducted by many). 
With the theory and goal in mind, we can now turn to the next step—the 
study’s design and its relation to the prior literature. 
A. The Prior Literature 
We begin with a review of the empirical literature. Previous attempts to 
measure the deterrent effects of tort law doctrines can be roughly divided 
 
 34 Indeed, but for the spectator’s decision to observe the race with approval, neither driver would 
agree to engage in the race, and no one would be harmed. Similarly, but for the non-injuring driver, the 
other driver would not drive carelessly even if encouraged by the spectator. For a discussion of the 
model’s assumptions and limitations, see Dillbary, supra note 31, at 57–63. 
 35 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 8, at 212 (discussing a scenario similar to Summers and noting that 
“it would be an economic mistake to let both off scot-free, as that would reduce deterrence”); see also 
supra notes 3–4, 6, 8–9, 17–18, 20.  
 36  See, e.g., Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing concurring-causation cases and noting that in such cases, “the requirement of proving 
causation is relaxed”); Shackil v. Lederle Lab’ys, 561 A.2d 511, 515 (N.J. 1989) (explaining that concert 
of action and alternative liability are exceptions to the “indispensable” cause-in-fact requirement). 
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into two types: (1) observational approaches and (2) experimental studies. 
To the best of our knowledge, none of these studies have directly tested the 
effect of group causation theories and the effects of dilution of liability nor 
have they tried to determine how an actor’s decision about whether or not to 
engage in a tortious activity impacts others who face the same dilemma.37 
1. The Observational Approach 
A number of prior empirical studies have used observational data to 
assess the deterrent effects of tort law, for example by comparing the 
outcomes from variations in liability regimes across jurisdictions and 
different types of tortious activities.38 In general, these studies provide mixed 
 
 37 There is a large, more general literature in psychology that investigates the relationships between 
causality, counterfactual reasoning, and attribution of responsibility. However, this literature does not 
directly engage the law’s structure and impacts as we do. See, e.g., Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control 
and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCH. BULL. 556, 571 (2000); David R. Mandel, Counterfactual and 
Causal Explanation: From Early Theoretical Views to New Frontiers, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 11 (David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton & Patrizia Catellani eds., 2005) 
(reviewing psychological literature on causal explanations and attribution and exploring the role of 
counterfactual thinking); Denis J. Hilton, John L. McClure & Ben R. Slugoski, The Course of Events: 
Counterfactuals, Causal Sequences and Explanations, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL 
THINKING, supra, at 44 (exploring relationship between counterfactuals, conditions, and construction of 
specific and general causal explanations); Barbara Spellman, Alexandra P. Kincannon & Stephen J. Stose, 
The Relation Between Counterfactual and Causal Reasoning, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING, supra, at 28 (describing the relationship between counterfactual and causal 
reasoning generally, including the role of underlying knowledge and information, the contingent relations 
between different types of judgment, and the potential for causal attribution in certain cases without need 
for outcome-changing counterfactuals (but-for relationship)).  
 38  See, e.g., Jill R. Horwitz & Joseph Mead, Letting Good Deeds Go Unpunished: Volunteer 
Immunity Laws and Tort Deterrence, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 585, 586 (2009) (examining tort 
liability for volunteers across states and finding a deterrent effect); FRANK A. SLOAN, EMILY M. STOUT, 
KATHRYN WHETTEN-GOLDSTEIN & LAN LIANG, DRINKERS, DRIVERS, AND BARTENDERS: BALANCING 
PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, at x (2000) (examining a range of empirical evidence 
across states and finding that tort liability has a deterrent effect for commercial alcohol servers). A number 
of studies investigated the deterrent effect of tort liability compared to no-fault auto-accident systems. 
Compare, e.g., Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability 
Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 382 (2004) (finding that introduction of no-fault rules 
led to an increase in fatalities), with Paul Zador & Adrian Lund, Re-analyses of the Effects of No-Fault 
Auto Insurance on Fatal Crashes, 53 J. RISK & INS. 226, 235 (1986) (finding the opposite effect). For 
further analysis of the impact of various tort reforms on auto accidents, see Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. 
Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, 50 J.L. & ECON. 221, 235 (2007), which analyzes the 
impact of various tort reforms, including damage caps, for auto accidents, and W. Jonathan Cardi, Randall 
D. Penfield & Albert H. Yoon, Does Tort Law Deter Individuals? A Behavioral Science Study, 9 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 567, 573–74 (2012), which provides a concise overview of these and other auto-
accident studies. Scholars have also tried to empirically test the impact of tort liability on medical 
malpractice. E.g., Bernard S. Black, Amy R. Wagner & Zenon Zabinski, The Association Between Patient 
Safety Indicators and Medical Malpractice Risk: Evidence from Florida and Texas, 3 AM. J. HEALTH 
ECON. 109, 135 (2017) (finding that increased patient safety was correlated to fewer malpractice claims, 
such that the risk of suit could incentivize increased quality of care); Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ 
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evidence on the deterrent effects of tort law. As Professors Theodore 
Eisenberg and Christoph Engel explain, such studies often suffer from a 
number of limitations. 39  They are unable to “fine tune dependent and 
independent variables”;40 are often subject matter-specific (e.g., focusing on 
medical malpractice or car accidents);41 generally cannot observe decisions 
at the individual level, the dynamic of group activities, or how the actions of 
one group member impact the behaviors of others; and may suffer from 
reverse causality.42  Most importantly, observational studies are often not 
well suited to determine causal links. As a recent study explains: “[E]xisting 
deterrence studies all suffer from the same limitation—they use proxies as a 
means of measuring the causal link between tort liability and changes in 
tortious behavior.” 43  Using proxies exacerbates another problem that is 
common to observational studies: the difficulty of determining whether the 
effects observed are the result of the legal rule investigated, some unobserved 
factors, or the unique characteristics of the dataset used. 
Our innovative experimental design allows us to overcome these 
shortcomings and directly test the impact of causation law on actors’ 
behaviors. By employing a well-known technique called the Strategy 
 
Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 970 
(2008) (finding that some medical malpractice tort reforms led to reduced tort awards and increased death 
rates, particularly for women); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: 
Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1598 (2002) (surveying literature 
that studied the deterrent effect of tort and malpractice litigation).  
 39 Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, Assuring Civil Damages Adequately Deter: A Public 
Good Experiment, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 301, 302 (2014) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Engel, Public 
Good Experiment] (discussing some limitations of studies). 
 40 Id. (stating that because of difficulty “specifying models of outcomes, such as fatality rates or 
damages awards,” researchers are “at the mercy of” observed variation).  
 41 See, e.g., supra note 38. A notable exception is Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis 
of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 377 (1994), which analyzes a range 
of activities and legal regimes including liability for workers’ injuries, motorist liability, and medical 
malpractice. See Don Dewees & Michael Trebilcock, The Efficacy of the Tort System and Its Alternatives: 
A Review of Empirical Evidence, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 57, 57 (1992) (reviewing evidence related to 
automobile accidents, medical malpractice, product liability, workers’ injuries, and environmental harm, 
with mixed support for deterrent effects of tort liability).  
 42  See, e.g., Cardi et al., supra note 38, at 574 (noting limitations of tort-deterrence literature 
including a narrow focus on particular rules and contexts and the correlational nature of studies); 
Eisenberg & Engel, Public Good Experiment, supra note 39, at 302 (explaining that a lack of panel data 
generally prevents dynamic study of an individual’s response to tort liability and highlighting issues of 
omitted variables and reverse causality).  
 43 Cardi et al., supra note 38, at 570–71 (emphasis added) (using a survey methodology to analyze 
the effect of different legal regimes on actors’ willingness to commit a tort and concluding that unlike the 
threat of criminal liability, the effect of potential tort liability did not have a significant effect on subjects’ 
stated willingness to engage in risky behaviors).  
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Method,44 we analyze actors’ decisions at the individual level. Importantly, 
the Strategy Method allows us to observe whether a subject’s decision to 
behave tortiously is conditional upon others acting tortiously as well. It is 
thus especially well suited to analyze the law’s causal effects and the tortfest 
dynamic. 
2. The Experimental Approach 
Our design also differs from previous experimental approaches, which 
are themselves a recent phenomenon in torts scholarship. 45  Some 
experimental studies use a survey-based approach. An example is the recent 
study by Professors W. Jonathan Cardi, Randall Penfield, and Albert Yoon, 
which asked first-year law students to rate the likelihood that they would 
engage in certain tortious activities and found no deterrent effect for tort 
law.46 Each student completed a survey that experimentally varied one of 
four possible legal regimes: no liability, criminal liability, tort liability, and 
unspecified liability.47 Survey studies are useful, but as the Cardi et al. study 
explicitly admits, they suffer from a major drawback that makes them 
unsuitable to test our hypotheses: survey studies rely on subjects’ self-
reported predictions rather than their actual behavior.48 The concern is that 
when it comes to making the decision in question—e.g., whether or not to 
commit a tort—subjects would behave differently than they said they 
would.49 Moreover, survey studies are often static in nature and do not allow 
 
 44 See infra Section II.B.4 (explaining the Strategy Method). 
 45  See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, Unpacking Negligence Liability: 
Experimentally Testing the Governance Effect, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 116, 120 (2016) 
[hereinafter Eisenberg & Engel, Unpacking Negligence Liability] (explaining that while “[i]n 
economics[] the experimental method has become very popular because experiments directly test formal 
theoretical models,” surprisingly, the “formal economic models of legal institutions have not very often 
been tested in the lab,” and noting that “[t]here is no more than a handful of pertinent experimental 
papers”).  
 46 See Cardi et al., supra note 38. 
 47 Id. at 578. In the unspecified regime, no legal regime was given, and “subject[s] [were] left with 
[their] own understanding of the possibility of sanctions or liability.” Id. at 578–80. 
 48 Id. at 571 (explaining that their experiment “engenders its own limitations,” including the fact that 
it “captured only participants’ self-predicted behaviors, not their actual behaviors”). The potential gap 
between self-reported choices and actual choices is a limitation common to experimental survey designs.  
 49 For an example of studies that compare laboratory experiments and survey studies, see Edward L. 
Glaeser, David I. Laibson, José A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, Measuring Trust, 115 Q.J. ECON. 
811, 841 (2000), which found standard attitudinal survey questions about trust are not very accurate at 
predicting trusting behavior in their experiments (in terms of trusting others to reciprocate monetary 
transfers in an incentivized trust game). Also, see Christoph Bühren & Thorben C. Kundt, Imagine Being 
a Nice Guy: A Note on Hypothetical vs. Incentivized Social Preferences, 10 JUDGMENT & DECISION 
MAKING 185, 185 (2015), which determined that behavior in dictator games is different between 
incentivized and hypothetical games. 
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researchers to observe the decision dynamic in real time, time trends, or, 
importantly, whether one’s action is dependent on her belief as to whether 
and how many actors will behave tortiously.50 
Like the Cardi et al. study, our methodology tests the causal impact of 
tort liability by comparing results for regimes with liability and no liability, 
as well as across contextualized scenarios and neutrally framed ones. 
However, our design is different in several important aspects. Chief among 
them is that we observe the subjects’ actual behavior in a context with real 
financial consequences, rather than relying on self-reports. Moreover, using 
a between-subject framework with multiple decision rounds, we are able to 
observe subjects’ decisions in different liability environments over time. 
This dynamic environment allows us to investigate whether experience 
changes their decisions or their beliefs about how others will respond. 
Lab experiments are a more recent, dynamic form of experimental study 
in tort law. A number of researchers have used experiments to assess how 
variations in tort-liability regimes might affect behavior. In a well-known 
study, Professors Lewis Kornhauser and Andrew Schotter asked each of the 
113 subjects to choose (at a cost) their level of care, which determined the 
probability that an accident would occur.51 Under a strict-liability regime, a 
subject paid a predetermined amount if the accident occurred. Under a 
negligence regime, payment was due only if the care taken was below an 
announced standard of care. 52  The authors found the choice of liability 
regime had a significant effect. 53  Professors Kornhauser and Schotter’s 
experiment “consider[ed] the simplest possible accident model” in which a 
“single” actor chose her desired precaution level.54 Their experiment did not 
incorporate a victim, consider the tortfeasor’s choice of the level of activity, 
or involve interactions between multiple potential tortfeasors. Subsequent 
work by Professors Vera Angelova, Giuseppe Attanasi, and Yolande Hiriart 
 
 50 See, e.g., Cardi et al., supra note 38, at 57677 (administering a survey as a single event exposing 
participants to randomized alternate vignettes to a elicit causal relationship); Eisenberg & Engel, Public 
Good Experiment, supra note 39, at 302 (noting advantages of experiments: “subjects repeatedly interact 
over time,” making it possible to observe “the dynamic individual-level process of behavior” and 
“observations over time enable evaluating the process leading to observed outcomes”). 
 51 Lewis Kornhauser & Andrew Schotter, An Experimental Study of Single-Actor Accidents, 19 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 203, 204, 208–09 (1990) (analyzing liability effects in a “model in which the actions of a 
single individual determine the expected frequency of occurrence of a loss”). The authors found that 
under a negligence regime, individuals chose the (exogenous) reasonable level of care. By contrast, under 
the strict-liability regime, the investment in care initially exceeded, then fell below, the efficient level. Id. 
at 231–32. 
 52 Id. at 208–09. 
 53 Id. at 213 (noting the hypothesis tests’ significance at 5% level). 
 54 Id. at 204. 
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incorporated a victim as part of the experiment, as well as an additional 
baseline treatment with no liability.55 
Building on this work, Professors Eisenberg and Engel designed an 
investment task where the more the active party invests, the higher the risk 
of harm is to another (a passive innocent party).56 They found that tort law 
has an expressive function that strengthens its deterrent effect by creating 
nonpecuniary motivations to avoid harming others. 57  This expressive 
function may result from the distaste for harming an innocent party, the 
tendency to adhere to social norms, and “the desire to avoid blame.”58 We 
follow Eisenberg and Engel’s steps by recognizing the possibility that 
psychological (nonpecuniary) costs may slow down the occurrence of a 
tortfest.59 However, unlike Eisenberg and Engel, our design also allows us to 
investigate how the dynamic interaction between prospective tortfeasors and 
the impact of shared liability change fairness perceptions. We find some 
support for the proposition that psychological costs (to the extent they are 
correlated with fairness) may be higher in the case of a single tortfeasor, but 
that they monotonically decrease as the number of tortfeasors increases—a 
phenomenon Eisenberg and Engel could not observe due to their design. 
A few researchers have used public-goods-style experiments to assess 
the impacts of tort law.60 In a different study, Eisenberg and Engel used a 
variant of a public-goods experiment to study the impact of tort-damage 
regimes.61 However, their study did not consider the potential for shared 
liability and joint action by wrongdoers. The more recent study by Professors 
Bruno Deffains, Roman Espinosa, and Claude Fluet used a public-goods 
 
 55 Vera Angelova, Giuseppe Attanasi & Yolande Hiriart, Relative Performance of Liability Rules: 
Experimental Evidence 2, 5 (Jena Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 2012-012, 2012), https://www.researchgate.net/ 
publication/239808054_Relative_Performce_of_Liability_Rules_Experimental_Evidence [https:// 
perma.cc/FSU8-T3AE].  
 56 Eisenberg & Engel, Unpacking Negligence Liability, supra note 45, at 119. 
 57 Id. at 134 (noting deterrent effects from courts that “make[] social expectations explicit” and 
“blame” defendants who fail to meet them, as distinct from incentives created by pecuniary liability).  
 58 Id. at 116. 
 59 Id. at 139 (finding that nonpecuniary expressive dimensions enhance deterrence). But note that in 
Eisenberg and Engel’s design, pecuniary liability is not contingent on the actions of other players, so there 
is no tortfest dynamic. We extend consideration of their findings by considering the implications in our 
design.  
 60  Public-goods experiments generally involve participants making private decisions about 
contributions to produce a public good that generates benefits which can be shared by all, even those who 
do not contribute fully. See, e.g., Rachel T.A. Croson, Public Goods Experiments, in BEHAVIOURAL AND 
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 221, 22122 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2010).  
 61 Eisenberg & Engel, Public Good Experiment, supra note 39, at 331 (contrasting individual tort 
damages with class action and punitive-damage analogs and finding some impact in the latter two 
categories). 
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experiment to investigate the impact of liability rules in cases where 
participants face trade-offs between privately profitable actions and 
imposing harm on others.62 Similar to Eisenberg and Engel, the Deffains et 
al. study found that liability rules have a “norm-activation effect.”63 They 
convey a message that leads participants to put more weight on social 
concerns and harms to others thereby increasing deterrence.64 The effect 
appears strongest for strict liability, and it complements the impact of social 
norms, which the authors believe are operative even when legal sanctions are 
absent or imperfectly enforced.65 Like its predecessors, however, the study 
did not consider the impact of liability in the context of multiple tortfeasors 
or the potential for shared liability. 
B. The Experimental Design and Procedure 
To our knowledge, this Article is the first to use an experimental 
approach to test the impact of shared tort liability on actors’ decisions 
whether or not to engage in a tortious activity while observing the subjects’ 
individual preferences. To directly test the effect of group causation theories, 
we designed a series of experiments, based on Example 1, in which actors 
independently and simultaneously decide whether or not to engage in a 
tortious activity, knowing others face the same dilemma. Importantly, in our 
experiments, acting is worthwhile only if a minimum number of actors 
decide to engage in the tortious activities. As such, our experiments can be 
viewed as a form of a “stag hunt” game.66 Broadly defined, these are cases 
 
 62 Bruno Deffains, Romain Espinosa & Claude Fluet, Laws and Norms: Experimental Evidence with 
Liability Rules, CENTRE DE RECHERCHE SUR LES RISQUES LES ENJEUX ÉCONOMIQUES ET LES POLITIQUES 
PUBLIQUES, June 2017, https://www.crrep.ca/sites/crrep.ca/files/fichier_publications/crrep-2017-05_0. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/CN3F-8QXA]. 
 63 Id. at 2. 
 64 Id. at 2, 14. 
 65 Id. at 2–3, 14. Note that the finding of a stronger effect under strict liability versus negligence was 
supported only by “weak evidence.” Id. at 14. 
 66 The logic of a “stag hunt” game is as follows: Let us suppose that there are a number of hunters 
who must choose between putting effort toward hunting a hare or a stag (i.e., a deer). The chances of 
catching a hare are independent of what others do. There is no chance of catching a stag alone, but the 
chances of a successful stag hunt go up sharply with the number of hunters who decide to join the hunt. 
A stag is much more valuable than a hare. Participants must decide independently whether to gamble the 
sure gain of the hare for the chance of success at a stag. In our experiment, the tort is similar to a “stag” 
in that committing the tort can be more beneficial than simply keeping the endowment, but it only 
becomes so with more tortfeasors acting. For a general discussion of such coordination games, see, for 
example, David Schmidt, Robert Shupp, James M. Walker & Elinor Ostrom, Playing Safe in 
Coordination Games: The Roles of Risk Dominance, Payoff Dominance, and History of Play, 42 GAMES 
& ECON. BEHAV. 281, 281 (2003). Our design is also related to threshold public-goods experiments, 
where a certain level of cooperation is needed for the production of the public good. In most cases, 
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in which parties’ payoffs depend on the level of implicit cooperation among 
subjects. Parties do not communicate in any manner with others about their 
strategies and choices. Rather, cooperation between potential tortfeasors can 
be achieved through trust or based on belief (in the case of unconditional 
decisions67) that others will behave in a certain way. 
Our experiments provide a consistent measure of the hypotheses tested 
and allow the study of repeated individual behavior over time. Importantly, 
they allow us to observe individual-level decision-making and, using the 
Strategy Method, to see how actors react causally to different incentive 
schemes.68  In the experiments, we manipulate variables of interest (e.g., 
whether there is tort liability or not) while subjects make choices that expose 
them to different actual monetary payoffs, dependent on the actions of other 
subjects, with the potential to impose real losses on a party in the experiment. 
For these reasons, this approach is especially well suited to test group 
dynamics in cases when the actions of one tortfeasor can benefit others 
through doctrines of causation that result in shared liability.69 
To test our hypotheses, we presented subjects with four incentive 
schemes (treatments) similar to the one described in Example 1 (reproduced 
below for convenience): 
 
Example 1. A number of actors70 (e.g., Factories) must choose between 
two activities: (1) a harmless activity (e.g., producing limestone) or 
(2) an alternative tortious activity (e.g., producing cement—a necessary 
ingredient for construction—that causes pollution). The harmless 
activity promises a $24 benefit whereas the alternative activity promises 
$35. However, if one or more actors engage in the alternative activity, 
an innocent victim will incur an expected harm of $24. The alternative 
activity is subject to liability. Taking care is either impossible or too 
costly. 
 
cooperation beyond the threshold amount is inefficient. We have a threshold in the Liability treatment, 
but efficiency only improves with “cooperation” beyond that point. For this reason, exactly three of four 
subjects committing the tort is not a Nash equilibrium (i.e., an equilibrium in which none of the subjects 
has an incentive to change their choice, conditional on the choices of others). 
 67 The use of unconditional and conditional decisions using the Strategy Method is discussed below. 
See infra Section II.B.4.  
 68 For an explanation of the Strategy Method, see infra Section II.B.4. 
 69 See infra Section II.B.4. For the external validity of lab experiments, see infra note 158 and 
accompanying text.  
 70 We use the term “actors” to refer to potential tortfeasors—that is, to those who have a choice and 
must decide whether to engage in a tortious activity. In the Context-Free frame, these actors are referred 
to as “Type-X” subjects. In the Vignette frame, they are referred to as the “Factories.” 
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1. The Context-Free (Neutrally Framed) Treatments 
In the Context-Free treatments, the experiment was framed in a way 
that is neutral in the sense that it does not include references to a “real world” 
context that might influence participants’ perceptions. This neutral framing 
is common in experimental studies as a way to focus on the basic underlying 
payoffs and how participants respond.71 We consider it first, before moving 
to an experiment that describes the context in a way that better reflects the 
choices facing potential tortfeasors in our Vignette treatments. Subjects 
participated in groups of five in a repeated setting (i.e., rounds). In each 
round, each subject was endowed with 24 experimental tokens. Four of the 
five subjects, called Type-X, were assigned as actors,72 and one subject, 
called Type-Y, was assigned as a party who may incur a loss. Type-X 
subjects, analogues of the Factories in Example 1, decided whether or not to 
“act” (i.e., whether or not to engage in the harmful activity). The subjects 
who chose to act lost their 24-token endowment but in return received 35 
tokens—the higher payoff from the harmful activity. The one Type-Y 
subject in the group, an analogue of the potential victim in Example 1, did 
not make any decisions during the experiment.73 However, Type-Y’s payoffs 
depended on the decisions of the Type-X subjects. If at least one Type-X 
subject chose to act, the Type-Y subject would have lost her 24-token 
endowment (i.e., the injury from the activity). 
The neutrally framed treatments varied in the applicable liability 
regime: Liability versus No Liability for the actors. In the Context-Free–
Liability treatment (CF–L), all Type-X subjects who chose to act had to fully 
compensate the Type-Y subject in equal shares.74 For instance, if two Type-
X subjects chose to act, each lost her 24-token endowment—the opportunity 
cost of forgoing the harmless activity—and received the payoff from the 
harmful activity of 35 tokens. Each was then required to transfer 12 tokens 
(24/2) to the Type-Y subject for a total gain of 23 tokens (35 – (24/2)). If 
three Type-X subjects chose to act, each gained 27 tokens (35 – (24/3)). 
 
 71 See Aleksandr Alekseev, Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, Experimental Methods: When and Why 
Contextual Instructions Are Important, 134 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 48, 57 (2017) (explaining the 
advantages of context-free instructions).  
 72 See supra note 70.  
 73 All groups, across all treatments, included a victim who was an actual participant. The victim is 
referred to as “Type-Y” in the Context-Free (neutrally framed) treatments and the “Owner” in the 
Vignette treatments. We allocated this role to a participant for two main reasons. The first was to avoid 
deception. Because subjects were told that their actions would result in a harm to a third party, the 
potential victim had to be included. Second, the knowledge that the victim is real and present can impact 
subjects’ decisions.  
 74 This apportionment rule is similar to that of several liability or joint and several liability with 
contribution. Because all subjects received an initial endowment, each is solvent. 
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In the Context-Free–No Liability treatment (CF–NL), none of the Type-
X subjects who chose to act were required to compensate the Type-Y subject. 
Thus, if at least one of the Type-X subjects chose to act, the Type-Y subject 
simply lost her 24-token endowment. For example, if two Type-X subjects 
chose to act, each received 35 tokens from acting, and neither was required 
to transfer tokens to the Type-Y subject. 
This means that under the No Liability treatment, the monetary payoffs 
for Type-X subjects who chose to act were constant and equal to 35 tokens. 
By contrast, under the Liability treatment, the monetary payoffs of Type-X 
subjects who chose to act were dependent on the total number of Type-X 
subjects who chose to act. As Table 1A shows, in the Liability treatment a 
Type-X subject was better off acting only if she was joined by two or three 
additional Type-X subjects (27, 29 > 24) but otherwise was better off 
keeping her 24-token endowment and refraining from acting (11, 23 < 24).75 
TABLE 1A: THE INCENTIVES TO ACT AS A FUNCTION OF THE NUMBER OF ACTORS 
The Number of Acting 
Type-X Subjects 
Payoffs of Each Acting 
Type-X Subject 
0 24 (= endowment) 
1 11 (= 35 – 24/1) 
2 23 (= 35 – 24/2) 
3 27 (= 35 – 24/3) 
4 29 (= 35 – 24/4) 
 
Note that although all Type-X subjects faced the same monetary 
incentive scheme, their actual gains from acting likely varied. The reason is 
that subjects may hold heterogeneous nonmonetary valuations associated 
with their actions. Notions of fairness, morality, inequality aversion, social 
preferences, or other-regarding preferences, to name a few determinants, 
may impact the actors’ subjective payoffs and, accordingly, their decisions.76 
 
 75 When a subject is joined by two actors—that is, as part of a group of three tortfeasors—each gain 
35 tokens and must pay one-third of the damage, or 8 tokens (24/3), for a net gain of 27 tokens. When a 
subject is joined by three actors, each pays less—only one-fourth of the damage for a net gain of 29 tokens 
(35 – (24/4)). In both cases, acting is worthwhile as it promises a higher gain compared with not acting 
(27, 29 > 24). By contrast, acting alone or with one other actor promises less than the 24-token 
endowment. Acting alone gives the actor 35 tokens, but after paying the victim 24 tokens for her damages, 
the actor has a net gain of only 11 tokens (35 – 24). Acting with another means that the two actors will 
share the cost of the victim injury. In such a case each will gain 23 tokens (35 – (24/2)), which is still less 
than the initial 24-token endowment. 
 76 James Konow, Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories, 41 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1188, 1189 (2003) (analyzing theories of fairness); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. ECON. 817, 819 (1999) (discussing 
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For example, some subjects could be comfortable knowing that if they act, 
the Type-Y subject would lose her endowment. Others might experience 
some nonmonetary, psychological cost from gaining at the expense of 
another, regardless of whether the Type-Y subject is compensated. 77  In 
general, we would expect these nonmonetary costs to be relatively small in 
our experimental setting, as participants interact anonymously.78 
2. The Vignettes 
In addition to the Context-Free treatments, we also conduct Vignette-
based treatments. The Vignettes provide a chance to check the internal 
validity of our results in a contextualized, real-world setting with the same 
incentive structure as our Context-Free treatments. They also help bridge the 
gap between our experimental setting and the real world, supporting the 
practical relevance of our results.  
In order to preserve comparability with our Context-Free treatments, 
we adopted a Vignette involving harm to property, potentially caused by a 
“polluting” factory.79 The liability regimes and payoffs remained the same as 
in the Context-Free treatments; the only difference was in the framing of the 
instructions. 80  These additional treatments used Vignettes to frame the 
decisions in a more realistic setting. In the Vignette–Liability (V–L) and 
Vignette–No Liability (V–NL) treatments, four of the subjects—the actors 
who had to decide whether to engage in the tortious activity—were referred 
 
inequity aversion); Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple 
Tests, 117 Q.J. ECON. 817, 817 (2002) (explaining models of social preferences). 
 77  For discussion of an example and the general the impact of nonmonetary costs on actors’ 
willingness to engage in harmful activity, see infra notes 9599 and accompanying text. 
 78 See Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat & Vernon Smith, Preferences, Property 
Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games, 7 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 346, 347–48 (1994) (finding 
that anonymity in bargaining games increased subjects’ self-regarding decisions, suggesting other-
regarding behavior is due to a desire for reciprocity instead of a preference for fairness); Gary Charness 
& Uri Gneezy, What’s in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games, 
68 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 29, 34 (2008) (finding that increasing social distance from other subjects 
encouraged self-interested behavior in bargaining games). 
 79 The property context allowed us to control the financial incentives faced by subjects and keep any 
psychological costs comparable to our Context-Free variant, in which “victims” lost only money. If, for 
example, we had used a personal-injury vignette, some subjects could have (hypothetically) expected 
some nonmonetary harms and may also have had very different psychological or moral costs associated 
with such harm. Although the context of “polluting” factories might be considered politically sensitive, 
we chose neutral vignette language—for example, we do not use the terms “pollute” or “victim” in the 
Vignettes. The effect we find is consistent across both our neutral and contextualized framings, which 
further suggests it is not simply an artifact of the choice of Vignette frame. 
 80 The difference in framing between the Context-Free treatment and the Vignette is in the terms 
used to describe the actors and the harmful activity. Type-X subjects, Type-Y subject, and “acting” in the 
former were replaced with “Factories,” “Owner,” and “switching to cement production” in the latter. The 
difference in framing is summarized in Table 1B.  
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to as Factories. The fifth subject—the potential victim—was referred to as 
the Owner of another structure nearby. Each Factory chose whether to keep 
producing limestone—“not acting” in the Context-Free treatments—or 
switch to producing cement—“acting” in the Context-Free treatments. If a 
Factory produced limestone, it kept its 24-token endowment. If a Factory 
switched to producing cement, the tortious activity, it lost its endowment but 
in return earned 35 tokens from producing cement. However, if at least one 
Factory switched to producing cement, the Owner nearby lost 24 tokens—
the full value of her structure. 
Table 1B summarizes the differences in framing across treatments. 
These changes to the frame of the instructions did not alter the monetary 
incentives of the decision environment. They may, however, have changed 
subjects’ perceptions.81 The contextual frames of the Vignettes allow us to 
test the robustness of our results from the neutrally framed experiments in 
this more realistic setting. 






Actors Type-X Factories 
Potential Victim Type-Y Owner 
Decision Whether “to act” Switch to cement production 
 
For brevity and consistency when discussing the treatments, we refer 
collectively to choices to act—in the Context-Free treatments—or produce 
cement—in the Vignettes—simply as the “choice to act.” Declining to act or 
producing limestone are both referred to as the “choice not to act.” 
3. Sessions and Rounds 
Each of the four treatments (summarized in Table 3 in Section II.E 
below) was administered in multiple separate sessions during which the 
treatment was repeated in seven rounds. At the beginning of each session, 
subjects were randomly assigned to one of two types: Type-X or Type-Y in 
the Context-Free treatments and Factory and Owner in the Vignettes. In each 
treatment, subjects in both roles—Type-X and Type-Y—received the same 
 
 81 Contextualized instructions in economics experiments can, in some instances, change behavior 
compared to behavior with neutral instructions. See Alekseev et al., supra note 71, at 49 (“[W]hen 
instructions are embedded in a meaningful, as opposed to abstract, context, behavior may change.”); 
Leigh Raymond & Timothy N. Cason, Can Affirmative Motivations Improve Compliance in Emissions 
Trading Programs?, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 659, 673 (2011) (finding that a neutral frame inspired less 
compliant behavior compared to context-framed treatments). 
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instructions.82 Subjects assigned as Type-X or Factories made their decisions 
in each round simultaneously—that is, without any knowledge of the other 
actors’ decisions in the given round. At the beginning of each round, groups 
were randomly rematched (i.e., Strangers Matching) to mitigate any 
reputational effect from repeated play with the same individuals.83 However, 
a subject’s type—Type-X or Type-Y—remained constant throughout the 
entire session. This avoided any potential effects that might have arisen from 
the order in which subjects played the two roles. At the end of each round, 
all subjects received information on the number of actors who chose to act 
and the final token earnings for the round. Additionally, actors were notified 
about their payoffs, and the potential victim was notified whether she 
incurred any losses and whether she was compensated. All subjects’ payoffs 
were a function of the liability regime and the number of subjects who chose 
to act. 
4. The Strategy Method 
To test the applicability of the but-for test in settings like concurrent 
causes and whether and under what conditions a tortfest would develop, we 
employed the Strategy Method.84 This method is used frequently to analyze 
subjects’ “willingness to contribute to public goods conditional on others’ 
contributions,”85 and is therefore especially suited for our purposes. This 
 
 82 To avoid influencing subjects, the instructions did not use terms such as actor, aggrieved party, 
tortfeasor, victim, or tort. See Alekseev et al., supra note 71, at 57 (explaining that the use of “evocative” 
terms may elicit emotional responses from subjects).  
 83 In an experimental session, subjects can be matched into fixed groups across decision rounds (i.e., 
Partners Matching) or subjects in the session can be randomly rematched into new groups across decision 
rounds (i.e., Strangers Matching). See generally James Andreoni & Rachel Croson, Partners Versus 
Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL 
ECONOMICS RESULTS 776 (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008) (discussing relevant studies 
on the effect of Partners Matching versus Strangers Matching).  
 84 For examples of studies that have utilized the Strategy Method, see Urs Fischbacher, Simon 
Gächter & Ernst Fehr, Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods 
Experiment, 71 ECON. LETTERS 397, 398 (2001), which employed a variant of the Strategy Method to 
examine conditional cooperation, and Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gächter, Social Preferences, Beliefs, and 
the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 541, 543–44 (2010), 
which applied the Strategy Method to test subjects’ contribution preferences. For a recent survey of the 
literature regarding the effectiveness of the method, see Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, The Strategy 
Versus the Direct-Response Method: A First Survey of Experimental Comparisons, 14 EXPERIMENTAL 
ECON. 375, 394–95 (2011), which reported that, in a few instances, employing the Strategy Method 
compared to the “direct-response” method (i.e., only making unconditional decisions) may have impacted 
subjects’ behaviors, but arguing that their study “should at least dispel the impression that the strategy 
method inevitably yields results that differ significantly from results gathered using the traditional direct-
response method.” 
 85 Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter & Simone Quercia, The Behavioral Validity of the Strategy 
Method in Public Good Experiments, 33 J. ECON. PSYCH. 897, 897–98 (2012) (finding that “the strategy 
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method allows us to observe whether a subject’s decision to act is conditional 
on others’ decisions to do the same. For example, it allows us to observe 
whether a Factory would prefer to engage in the tortious activity only if two 
or more other Factories would do the same but would prefer to engage in the 
harmless activity otherwise. 
The method works as follows. In the beginning of each round, every 
actor—subjects assigned as Type-X or Factories—made two types of 
decisions. First, the actor made an unconditional decision to act.86 Following 
the unconditional decision, each actor made conditional decisions by filling 
out an Action Table in which they chose whether to act in all possible 
conditional scenarios.87 The Action Table in the Context-Free treatments are 
reproduced below as Tables 2A and 2B. 
TABLE 2A: TYPE-X SUBJECT UNCONDITIONAL DECISION TO ACT 
Your Unconditional Decision to Act  
Do you choose to act? Act or Not 
TABLE 2B: TYPE-X SUBJECT CONDITIONAL DECISION TO ACT (ACTION TABLE) 
Your Conditional Decisions to Act (Action Table)  
If none of the other three Type-X members choose to act, would 
you choose to act? 
Act or Not 
If one of the other Type-X members chooses to act, but the other 
two Type-X members choose not to act, would you choose to 
act? 
Act or Not 
If two of the other Type-X members choose to act, but the other 
Type-X member chooses not to act, would you choose to act? 
Act or Not 
If all three of the other Type-X members choose to act, would 
you choose to act? 
Act or Not 
 
At the end of each round, the Action Table of one of the four actors was 
randomly chosen for that round’s earnings calculation. For the other three 
 
method and the direct response method yield qualitatively similar results” and “that consistency between 
expressed cooperation preferences and actual contributions increases over time”); see Jillian Jordan, 
Katherine McAuliffe & David Rand, The Effects of Endowment Size and Strategy Method on Third Party 
Punishment, 19 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 741, 742–43 (2016) (explaining that “[u]nder the strategy method, 
subjects are asked to make decisions about how to react to each possible action of the other players, prior 
to learning what actions the other players actually took”); see also supra note 84. 
 86 See infra Table 2A. 
 87 See infra Table 2B. 
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actors in the group, only their unconditional decisions were used to calculate 
earnings in that round.88 The following example illustrates the procedure. 
 
Example 2. Consider a Context-Free treatment with a Liability regime. 
Suppose Type-X subject X1 is randomly chosen in a round. This means 
the computer will use X1’s Action Table to calculate earnings in this 
round. The unconditional decisions for Type-X subjects X2, X3, and 
X4 will be used to calculate earnings. Suppose further that X2 and X3 
made unconditional decisions to act and X4 made the unconditional 
decision not to act. 
Suppose X1 indicated in her Action Table that she would act if 
two other Type-X subjects chose to act. In such a case, X2 and X3 (both 
of whom chose to act unconditionally) and X1 (who chose to act if two 
others joined her) would act in this round. As a result, X1’s, X2’s, and 
X3’s (monetary) earnings would each be 27 tokens (35 – (24/3)), 
whereas X4, who chose not to act unconditionally, would earn 24 
tokens. 89 Type-Y’s earnings (i.e., compensation) would be 24 tokens. 
The Strategy Method creates appropriate incentives for individuals to 
reveal their true preferences because of the chance that their choices, 
unconditional and conditional, could be used to determine their payoffs 
from the experiment. 
5. Procedure: Review Questions, Risk Proclivity, and  
Exit Questionnaire 
All sessions for the pilot and main treatments were conducted at 
Appalachian State University in the Appalachian Experimental Economics 
Lab (AppEEL) using z-Tree software. After entering the lab, subjects were 
randomly assigned to computer stations. After reading the instructions, 
subjects answered review questions to test their understanding of the basic 
protocol and incentives of the experiment. The first round began only after 
all review questions were answered correctly. Following the experiment’s 
seven rounds, subjects also completed the monetarily incentivized Holt and 
Laury risk-preference task to measure risk aversion.90 
 
 88 In addition to their Types (Type-X or -Y), subjects were also assigned an anonymous ID each 
round. Type-X IDs were X1, X2, X3, and X4. The Type-Y ID was Y. In the contextually framed Vignette 
treatments, Factory IDs were F1, F2, F3, and F4, and the Owner ID was O. 
 89 The difference between the 35 tokens from acting and the 8 tokens (24/3) that each will need to 
transfer to fully compensate Y for her 24-token loss. 
 90 See Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 
1644, 1645 (2002). This has become the standard method for assessing risk aversion in experimental 
settings; it has been cited over 6,000 times. See, e.g., Lisa R. Anderson & Jennifer M. Mellor, Are Risk 
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Subjects then completed a post-experiment questionnaire. In addition 
to demographic data on subjects’ characteristics, such as age and education, 
subjects were asked to rank the fairness of the decision to act—i.e., choose 
the harmful activity—as a function of the number of actors. Using a scale 
from 0 to 5, with 0 being unfair and 5 being completely fair, subjects 
evaluated the fairness to: (1) the victim, (2) the actors, and (3) society, 
defined as all of the subjects in the group (i.e., the actors and the victim).  
To reduce the incentive to hedge across rounds, subjects were paid in 
cash at the end of each session. The payment was based on one randomly 
chosen decision round in the experiment. For example, if Round 4 was 
randomly chosen from the seven rounds, the subjects received a cash amount 
based on the number of tokens they earned in Round 4. 
6. Subject Characteristics 
Our subjects were drawn from the student population at Appalachian 
State University. Although our experimental method does not require a 
sample that is representative of the general population, we collected data on 
participant characteristics to check and control for whether any particular 
aspects of our subject pool influenced our results. 91  A summary of our 
sample can be found in Table AII-6. Slightly more than half (56%) of the 
subjects were females. Approximately 78% of the subjects were white. The 
average age of our subjects was twenty-two. Slightly more than half of the 
subjects indicated belief in a higher power of some form (57%). Almost 
exactly half our subjects indicated a political orientation; among them 
approximately 58% were Democrats and 42% were Republicans. Across 
political parties, the average intensity in political party was 2.33 out of 5. 
Just under 43% of the subjects had majors in the Business School. On 
average, subjects had participated in one previous economics experiment in 
the lab. Our subjects were slightly risk averse, scoring 4.5 on average on the 
Holt and Laury scale, for which larger measures indicate more risk-seeking 
preferences, and a measure of 5 is risk neutral.92 The collection of these 
participant controls allows us to see the variation we have in our sample of 
 
Preferences Stable? Comparing an Experimental Measure with a Validated Survey-Based Measure, 39 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 137, 137–38 (2009) (recognizing the Holt and Laury lottery-choice task as the 
“‘gold standard’ in the experimental literature on risk aversion”). This measure allowed us to control for 
the possibility that differences in risk tolerance across participants could influence our results. 
 91 See infra Section II.E.5 for a discussion of regressions with controls, finding that none of the 
measured participant characteristics drive our results.  
 92 See infra Table AII-4 for a breakdown by liability regime. The scale is based on the number of 
instances a subject chooses Lottery B over Lottery A. Holt and Laury designed their lottery-choice task 
such that, in a menu of ten lottery choicesA and Bthe expected value of Lottery B first becomes 
larger than Lottery A for Decision 5. If a subject chooses Lottery B more than five times, they are 
exhibiting risk-seeking preferences. See Holt & Laury, supra note 90, at 1645, 1649. 
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subjects and empirically test for the importance of these individual 
characteristics. 
C. The Hypotheses and Theoretical Predictions 
We used the various treatments and the Strategy Method to test the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Reduced Deterrence. The imposition of tort liability on 
multiple actors can encourage, rather than discourage, actors to engage 
in tortious activities. We hypothesize that the imposition of liability on 
multiple actors will incentivize an actor who would alone engage in a 
harmless activity to switch to a tortious activity if liability is imposed 
on a large enough number of actors. We test this hypothesis by 
comparing decisions to act in settings in the Liability regime and 
settings in the No Liability regime. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Tortfest. The imposition of tort liability can result in a 
tortfest, where the more actors join the tortious activity, the more 
beneficial and enticing the activity becomes. We hypothesize that the 
demand for a tortfest will increase with the number of tortfeasors. We 
test this hypothesis by using the Strategy Method to compare 
individuals’ conditional decisions as the number of actors increases. 
 
Hypothesis 3: But-For. The but-for test can be operable in tortious 
activities involving multiple actors, such as concurrent causes. In 
overdetermined cases, where each actor’s action can alone destroy the 
victim’s endowment, each concurring force is a but-for cause of the 
harm. This means that in the case of n actors, but for the engagement of 
the marginal tortfeasor, none will engage in the activity, and the victim 
will not be harmed. This hypothesis is also tested by examining 
individuals’ conditional decisions using the Strategy Method. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The Nature of the Activity—Context. We hypothesize 
that the context of a tortious behavior can affect the salience of costs 
and benefits, including any fairness concerns, making them more 
apparent to individuals. We test this hypothesis by contrasting the 
contextualized Vignette frame with the Context-Free frame. The 
factory Vignette uses a realistic scenario that highlights the social 
benefit from the tort (cement production). By contrast, in the Context-
Free frame, the social benefits from the activity are less salient. 
Although the payoffs are the same in both treatments, we hypothesize 
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that the willingness to act will be higher in the Vignette frame compared 
to the Context-Free frame. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Alternative Fairness Ideals. Tort liability is often 
linked to ideas of fairness. We have two competing hypotheses about 
the way tort liability may impact actors’ perceptions of fairness, 
depending on the number of actors: 
A. The Expressive Function and Moral Culpability. One 
possibility is that, in addition to its consequent monetary costs, tort 
liability may signal the unfairness or moral culpability of an action.93 
This would suggest individuals will be less willing to act under the 
Liability regime and perceive acting as less fair to the victim. The 
activity may be perceived as more morally reprehensible as the number 
of tortfeasors increases—that is, as more actors “gang up” on the victim. 
B. Moral Excuses and Mob Mentality. Another possibility is that 
tort liability may mitigate perceptions of unfairness. For example, 
actors may see liability as a “price” for acting. This price may crowd 
out social norms94 and reduce any psychological costs from harming the 
victim, so they are more easily offset by monetary benefits.95 A larger 
number of acting participants may also imply that the tortious activity 
is socially acceptable or at least not as reprehensible as it would be 
perceived if only one or a few engaged in it.96 Because the monetary 
 
 93 For work on the expressive function of law in shaping such social and moral norms, see, for 
example, Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 457 (1997); 
Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586 (1998); Richard H. 
McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340 (2000); Yuval Feldman & 
Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577, 578 (2006); and Janice 
Nadler, Expressive Law, Social Norms, and Social Groups, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 60, 61 (2017). 
 94 See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2000) (arguing that 
liability can crowd out social norms and lead to an increase in the undesired behavior). But see Cherie 
Metcalf, Emily A. Satterthwaite, J. Shahar Dillbary & Brock Stoddard, Is a Fine Still a Price? Replication 
as Robustness in Empirical Legal Studies, 63 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 48 (2020) (finding the crowding-
out effect may have limited applicability). 
 95 See, e.g., Bruno Deffains & Claude Fluet, Legal Liability when Individuals Have Moral Concerns, 
29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 930, 942 (2013) (using theoretical treatment and finding crowding out of moral 
concerns with perfectly enforced tort liability). It is important to note that our particular experiments 
allow us to test this theory only in the context of harms to property, not tortious physical harm to 
individuals. 
 96 Here, it is important to note that in a tortfest dynamic, when the social benefit of the action changes 
from negative to positive, there may also be a corresponding effect on fairness perception: as more actors 
join in a “harmful” activity, the action may be perceived as more morally acceptable. For similar 
arguments related to the potential expressive role for law in shaping social norms, see supra note 93 and 
accompanying text. 
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price imposed by tort liability decreases with the number of tortfeasors, 
as liability is shared by all, a tortfest may also erode the psychological 
costs associated with the tortious activity when the activity is conducted 
by many.  
We test these two competing hypotheses by comparing 
willingness to act across the liability treatments and by examining the 
fairness ratings in the post-experiment questionnaire. 
 
We recognize that under the No Liability regimes, actors may incur a 
moral or psychological cost if they decide to act, as acting imposes an 
uncompensated loss on the innocent subject. 97  Accordingly, a few 
observations regarding the No Liability treatments are in place. First, we 
expect that the psychological cost would be highest when an actor decides to 
act alone because that actor would be the sole reason for the harm. 
Consequently, the psychological cost may decrease as the number of actors 
increases, as moral responsibility is shared. A large number of tortfeasors 
may also imply that the activity is more socially acceptable and thus, by 
definition, less morally costly. Finally, the monetary benefits may simply 
outweigh any psychological costs. We expect that subjective psychological 
costs would not be especially high in our experimental setting, but subjects 
who have particularly strong moral intuitions may still decline to act because 
of these psychological costs.98 
In the Liability regimes, there is no dominant strategy in terms of 
expected monetary payoffs. With only one or two subjects acting, each is 
better off not acting, but with two or more subjects acting together, each is 
better off acting. 99  There are therefore two possible pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria: no subjects choose to act or all four subjects choose to act. 
Subjects’ unconditional choices reflect their beliefs about the degree of 
implicit cooperation when the shared Liability rule is in place. The Strategy 
 
 97  See, e.g., Deffains & Fluet, supra note 95, at 93031 (discussing generally reluctance of 
individuals to impose harm on others due to costs in the form of guilt, in addition to possible social 
disapproval); id. at 938–39 (stating that in a No Liability regime, “individuals will take some precautions 
because . . . they anticipate the guilt of causing uncompensated harm”).  
 98 To illustrate, consider a No-Liability session in which each of the four Type-X subjects, X1–X4, 
must decide whether to act for a gain of 35 tokens or refrain from acting and gain only 24 tokens. Suppose 
that, due to moral preferences, the psychological cost from engaging in an activity that inflicts harm on 
another (the Type-Y subject) is 4, 8, 16, and 20 tokens, respectively. This means that the net gain from 
the activity for each respectively is $31 (35 – 4), $27 (35 – 8), $19 (35 – 16), and $15 (35 – 20). In such 
a case, X1 (who values acting at 31 tokens) and X2 (who values acting at 27 tokens) would act, but X3 
and X4 would not (19, 15 < 24). 
 99 See supra Section I.A (analyzing the incentive scheme in Example 1 under a Liability regime). 
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Method allows us to observe subjects’ conditional strategies and test for the 
impact of the shared Liability regime directly. 
D. The Pilot 
Prior to running the full range of treatments, we conducted a pilot that 
allowed us to test the procedures and basic design of the experiments. Below 
we report briefly on the main results from the pilot sessions. 
Sixty-four subjects participated in the pilot, which involved two 
Context-Free–Liability (CF–L) sessions and two Context-Free–No Liability 
(CF–NL) sessions, each with seven rounds. These treatments differed from 
the treatments used in the primary analysis100 in that pilot groups had only 
four members: three Type-X subjects and one Type-Y subject. A limitation 
of the pilot results is that the smaller group size and payoff incentives, 
combined with the use of the Strategy Method, created a dominant strategy 
for unconditional action in the Liability treatment.101 The treatments in the 
full experiment were modified to increase the number of Type-X subjects 
from three to four and adjust the monetary payoffs to avoid the creation of a 
dominant strategy in the Liability treatment.  
FIGURE 1: AVERAGE UNCONDITIONAL DECISIONS BY LIABILITY TREATMENT IN PILOT 
 
Although a detailed analysis of the pilot session is reported in 
Appendix I, it is worth noting two results here. For each treatment, Figure 1 
 
 100 These treatments in the full experiment are reported below, infra Section II.E.  
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above shows the average unconditional decisions to act in each of the seven 
rounds. The vertical axis is the proportion of Type-X subjects who chose to 
act in a particular round. The horizontal axis is the round number. Notice that 
in every Context-Free round, the proportion of Type-X subjects choosing to 
act is higher in the CF–L (Liability) regime than in the CF–NL (No Liability) 
regime. In the CF–NL treatment, subjects were also much less willing to act 
alone than when joined by one or two others.102 These results are surprising 
given that the dominant strategy to act in CF–NL was more apparent than 
the dominant strategy to act in CF–L. The result may indicate Type-X 
subjects’ other-regarding preferences,103 such as kindness or guilt for the 
subject, who was left with zero tokens when one Type-X subject acted in 
CF–NL. The results are also consistent with the prediction that under the No 
Liability regime, an actor will be less inclined to engage in a tortious activity 
by herself but more inclined to do so with others. While not as consistent in 
the full experiment, we find similar evidence when the unconditional 
dominant strategy to act is removed. Importantly, the pilot’s results indicate 
that subjects understood the instructions and procedures and reacted 
consistently to the different liability regimes, as is also confirmed by the 
results in the full experiment. 
E. The Full Experiment 
The full experiment involved 200 subjects. 104  We conducted three 
independent sessions for each of our treatments: the Context-Free treatment 
with No Liability (CF–NL) and Liability (CF–L), and the Vignette 
(Factories) with No Liability (V–NL) and Liability (V–L). As with the pilot, 
each session involved seven rounds with randomly rematched subjects for 
each round. A summary of the experiments is shown in Table 3.105 
  
 
 102  See infra Table AI-2. 
 103 See supra note 76; infra note 139 (discussing economic literature on individual preferences that 
incorporate aspects of others’ welfare); see also supra notes 9498 and accompanying text (explaining 
the role of psychological constraints such as guilt or social disapproval on willingness to impose harm on 
others). 
 104 The risk and demographic controls are reported in Tables AII-4 and Table AII-5. 
 105 The average earning per subject was $18.20 per session, which included $1.38 from the risk 
elicitation task and $16.82 on average from the experiment.  
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No Liability (CF–NL) 
4 Type-X 
1 Type-Y 





Liability 3 50 
Vignette 
No Liability (V–NL) 
4 Factories 
1 Owner 
None 3 60 
 
The summary statistics across sessions and rounds for the full range of 
treatments are shown in Table 4. We begin by comparing liability regimes 
in the Context-Free treatments, followed by an analysis of the Vignette 
treatments. 
TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ACROSS ALL ROUNDS106 
 CF–L N = 36107 
CF–NL 
N = 36 
V–L 
N = 40 
V–NL 
N = 48 









     
Conditional Decision to Act upon:     
0 other 









































 106  Percentages reflect the proportion of subjects—Type-Xs in the Context-Free treatments and 
Factories in the Vignettes—who decided to act, averaged across all seven rounds. Values in parentheses 
are standard deviations across actors’ (Type-X subjects’ and Factories’) average decisions to act. The 
difference in sample sizes for each treatment in Tables 3 and 4 is the forty innocent (nonacting) parties 
(Type-Y subjects and Owners) in the experiment. 
 107 In this case, N equals the number of Type-X or Factories in the treatments, as they are the 
decision-makers in groups. The total number of subjects in each treatment (as reported in Table 3) include 
the Type-Y subjects. All analysis based on subjects’ decisions to act does not include Type-Y or Owners. 
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1. The Context-Free Treatment: Tort Liability and Deterrence 
The first hypothesis we seek to test with our experiments relates to the 
deterrent effect of tort law in cases involving group causation where liability 
is diluted as the number of liable tortfeasors increases. 
 Unconditional decisions to act 
We begin by examining the unconditional decisions to act. On average, 
a smaller proportion of Type-X subjects chose to act under the Liability 
regime compared to No Liability—68.25% versus 81.75%—in the Context-
Free treatment. Figure 2 shows the differences in averages across rounds in 
the Context-Free treatment. However, these apparent differences are not 
statistically significant.108 This result provides some support for our general 
hypothesis. The possibility that shared liability may dilute the costs of action 
appears to weaken the deterrent effect of tort liability to the point that its 
effect is statistically indistinguishable from willingness to act under a No 
Liability regime. 
 
FIGURE 2: AVERAGE UNCONDITIONAL DECISIONS TO ACT BY ROUND 
 
Formal regression analysis allows us to take advantage of the panel 
nature of the data. We use a multilevel logit panel regression to examine the 
likelihood a Type-X subject chooses to act (0 or 1). The primary independent 
variable is a dummy variable that captures the effect of liability introduced 
 
 108 Using nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, we reject the hypothesis that more subjects choose 
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in the CF–L treatment relative to the omitted CF–NL treatment. The 
multilevel regression also controls for statistical dependence at the session 
and individual levels.109 Table 5 reports our logit-regression coefficients as 
odds ratios for unconditional decisions (Model 1) and for the various 
conditional decisions (Models 2–5). An odds ratio for CF–L is defined as the 
probability a subject in CF–L acts divided by the probability a subject in CF–
NL acts. Thus, when the odds ratio is less than 1, the likelihood of acting 
when under Liability is relatively less than the likelihood of acting under No 
Liability. Conversely, an odds ratio greater than 1 would indicate that actors 
are more likely to act under Liability than under No Liability. 





















p = 0.066 
0.01*** 
p < 0.001 
< 0.01*** 
p < 0.001 
1.41 
p = 0.685 
6.01 
p = 0.160 
 
Starting with the unconditional decision to act, the coefficient for the 
CF–L dummy variable in Model 1 is less than 1 but only weakly significant 
at the 10% level (p = 0.066). This implies that actors are less likely to act 
unconditionally under a Liability regime compared to a No Liability regime, 
although this evidence of a deterrent effect is not highly significant. 
 Conditional decisions to act 
Turning to conditional willingness to act, subjects under a No Liability 
regime are more likely to act than those under a Liability regime, both when 
they act alone (48.81% versus 15.08%) and with only one other (79.76% 
versus 29.76%).111 These differences in percentages of subjects acting are 
highly statistically significant.112 This behavior is consistent with the theory. 
When facing liability, acting alone or with another is a losing strategy: it 
yields fewer benefits ($11 and $23, respectively) compared to not acting 
($24). As predicted by the theory, tort liability deters in these circumstances. 
 
 109 See infra Appendix II for further details. 
 110 The full regression models are reported in Appendix II. 
 111  See supra Table 4. 
 112 Using nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, differences in willingness to act with Liability 
versus No Liability conditional on 0 others and 1 other are statistically significant (each comparison 
p < 0.001, n = 72). Regression analysis also supports this conclusion as the CF–L coefficients in Models 
2 and 3 of Table 5 are less than 1 and highly significant (p < 0.001 in both comparisons).  
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By contrast, with a group of three or more actors—that is, when acting 
yields monetary gains under Liability—the proportion of Type-X subjects 
who were willing to engage in the tortious activity was actually higher with 
Liability than with No Liability (92.06% versus 87.70% for 2X and 96.42% 
versus 88.89% for 3X).113 An examination of the odds ratios in Table 5 
provides additional support: conditional on two or three others, the odds ratio 
estimates switch from being less than 1 to being greater than 1—indicating 
that actors are more likely to behave tortiously under a Liability regime.114 
While these differences across liability regimes are not statistically 
significant, the results show that once joined by enough actors, the dilution 
of liability renders any deterrent effect of tort law indistinguishable from a 
regime with No Liability.115 
The results are consistent with our first hypothesis—that group 
causation theories erode the deterrent effect of liability regimes. They are 
also consistent with the tortfest dynamic we observe.116 As the number of 
actors increases, liability is further diluted, the individual monetary benefits 
increase, and, consequently, more are willing to engage in the tortious 
behavior. In the Context-Free–Liability (CF–L) treatment, conditional on 
two others acting, when acting becomes profitable, liability loses its deterrent 
effect. Conditional on three others acting, as the gain increases, our point 
estimates indicate actors may be even more likely to engage in the tortious 
behavior compared to a No Liability regime. This may seem odd at first. But 
a number of reasons could support the pattern: First, under a Liability regime, 
the victim is compensated. Actors may thus experience a reduction in their 
moral cost compared to No Liability. Second, as we show below, we observe 
that fairness-rating levels increase with the number of tortfeasors, thus 
suggesting another decrease in nonpecuniary costs. Third, the increase in the 
number of actors increases the individual monetary payoff of each actor. 
Finally, as the individual payoffs become positive, so do the net social gains. 
 
 113  See supra Table 4. 
 114 The individual odds-ratio estimates are not statistically different from 1 due to large standard 
errors. P-values are found in Table 5 for the individual estimates. The lack of significance here only 
illustrates the absence of a deterrent effect for tort law at these higher participation levels. 
 115 Using nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, the difference in willingness to act with Liability 
versus No Liability is not statistically significant conditional on two others and is weakly significant 
conditional on three others (p = 0.931 conditional on two others acting and p = 0.105 conditional on three 
others, n = 72). However, multilevel panel regressions find treatment differences are not statistically 
different for both comparisons. The coefficients in Models 4 and 5 of Table 5 are greater than 1 but not 
statistically significant (p = 0.685 conditional on two others acting; p = 0.160 conditional on three others 
acting). 
 116  See infra Section II.E.2. 
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Thus, actors may be able to view their actions and the ensuing harm to the 
compensated victim as necessary for the greater good.117 
2. Context-Free Treatment: Tortfest and Causation 
 Tortfest 
Our second and third hypotheses relate to the potential for tort law itself 
to induce multiple subjects to join in the tort—the tortfest dynamic. In part, 
this dynamic arises because but-for causation is operative, even though, 
according to tort law jurisprudence and scholarship, it does not function in 
concurring-causes cases.118 
By analyzing the conditional decisions made in the Strategy Method, 
we provide support for the tortfest dynamic. Table 4 shows that the 
proportion of subjects willing to commit a tort under the Liability treatment 
(when averaged across all decision rounds) increases as the number of others 
committing the tort increases. Conditional on zero and one other Type-X 
subject committing a tort, the proportion of Type-X subjects choosing to act 
increases from 15.08% to 29.76%. While this is higher than the theoretical 
prediction of 0%, the tortfest and but-for predictions are extremely stark 
when examining the increase in willingness to commit a tort conditional on 
two and three others also committing the tort: 92.06% and 96.42%, 
respectively. It is clear that subjects understand the incentives created by the 
Liability regime and would like to engage in group “wrongdoing” if a large 
enough number of participants join them. 
 
 117 In this sense, acting is similar to a Pareto Public Good that improves overall welfare in a group, 
even though it may actually hurt some group members. Sagi Dekel, Sven Fischer, & Ro’i Zultan, 
Potential Pareto Public Goods, 146 J. PUB. ECON. 87, 87–88 (2017) (describing and providing examples 
of Pareto Public Goods and testing voluntary contributions to such goods).  
 118 See supra notes 5, 10–11; supra Section I.B. 
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FIGURE 3: CONDITIONAL DECISIONS TO ACT UNDER LIABILITY AND NO LIABILITY 
TREATMENTS BY ROUND 
 
The top graph in Figure 3 above shows that under the Liability 
treatments, we observe a monotonic increase in the average proportion of 
Type-X subjects acting as we move from decisions conditional on zero to 
one, two, and three other Type-X subjects participating. Each of these jumps 
in Type-X’s conditional willingness to participate is statistically 
significant.119 This result contradicts the assumption that extending liability 
 
 119 Using nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, each of these jumps in Type-X’s conditional 
willingness to participate is statistically significant (comparing average conditional willingness to act 
across all rounds, 15.08% to 29.76%, p = 0.022; to 92.06%, p < 0.001; and to 96.42%, p = 0.055, n = 36). 
Panel regression analysis comparing individuals’ conditional decisions in all decision rounds controlling 
for individual-level and session-level dependencies is not possible. An alternative robustness check is 
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will always deter actors in a group, instead showing it can produce a dynamic 
in which subjects become more willing to act as they are joined by others. 
In the treatments with No Liability (the bottom graph in Figure 3 
above), we see a different pattern. We still observe a similar increase in 
conditional willingness to participate in tortious activity as the number of 
participants grows: from 48.81% (conditional on no one else acting) to 
79.76% (conditional on another acting), rising to 87.70% (conditional on two 
others acting), and to 88.89% (conditional on three others acting). However, 
unlike the Liability treatment, the largest, statistically significant jump is 
between willingness to act conditional on no one else acting (that is, 0X) and 
willingness to act conditional on one other person acting (1X). The 
differences in willingness to act after that (that is, between 1X, 2X, and 3X) 
are smaller and not significant at the 5% level.120 Although Type-Xs in the 
No Liability treatments are clearly reluctant to act alone, even without facing 
liability, this hesitation generally disappears once they are joined by even 
one other Type-X. From that point on, the participation of additional Type-
Xs is not systematically influential in the same way we see under the 
Liability regime.  
It is in our Liability treatment that we see a marked difference in the 
effect of an additional tortfeasor when moving from 1X to 2X, where the 
additional actor makes the tort become profitable. Under shared liability, as 
the tortfest theory predicts, the willingness of our Type-X to participate also 
increases systematically with the number of actors beyond this point. These 
differences from No Liability provide strong support for the tortfest effect 
and its weakening of deterrence. 
 But-for causation 
We also find strong evidence suggesting that the but-for test can operate 
in cases involving group causation such as concurrent causes, thus 
supporting our third hypothesis. Under the Liability regime, we observe how 
but-for causation influences the results by examining the Type-Xs’ 
conditional decisions. As discussed above and shown in Figure 3, in general 
Type-X subjects are unwilling to act unless joined by at least two others. 
Below this threshold, at most 30% of Type-Xs would act on average. This is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction discussed in Part II. With only one 
or two Type-X subjects acting, we observe very little willingness to act. But 
 
 120  Using nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests comparing average conditional willingness to 
act across all rounds, the increase in Type-X’s conditional willingness to participate is statistically 
significant between conditional on 0X and 1X (p < 0.001, n = 36). The further increase between 
conditional on 1X and 2X is weakly significant (79.76% to 87.70%, p = 0.089), and the increase between 
conditional on 2X and 3X is not significant (87.70% to 92.06%, p < 0.646, n = 36). An alternative 
robustness check using Round 1 data only is discussed in Appendix II. 
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with two or more Type-X subjects participating, actors seem to be eager to 
join the tortfest because of the dilution of liability. Graphically, the top graph 
in Figure 3 above illustrates the but-for dynamic, by creating a clear, very 
large, and statistically significant jump from acting conditional upon one 
other subject acting as well (1X) to acting conditionally upon two other 
subjects acting (2X)—more than a 62% increase in willingness to act (from 
29.76% to 92.06%). We observe the same, equally strong effect in the 
Vignette (23.57% to 86.79%) and the pilot (12.50% to 95.24%).121 
The increased willingness to act conditional on two or three others 
acting together is consistent with the financial-incentive effect for a tortfest 
created by shared liability. This effect and our results provide additional 
evidence that a tortfest would not develop but for participation by others. 
The increased willingness to join—conditional on two or three others—may 
also reflect a decrease in psychological (nonpecuniary) costs. For example, 
participants may believe that a larger number of tortfeasors indicates less 
moral culpability from acting. In such a case, one would expect that more 
actors would be willing to gradually join the tortfest as the number of actors 
increases. We indeed find strong evidence for this fairness hypothesis.122 
The importance of but-for causation in our results is clear. The number 
of Type-X actors who are willing to participate unconditionally in the 
tortious act depends critically on their expectations about what others will 
choose. The relatively high proportion of Type-X who act unconditionally 
under the Liability regimes (68.25% in CF–L and 85.36% in V–L) reflects 
actors’ general belief that they will in fact be joined by others. But for the 
belief that a third or a fourth person will also engage in the tortious activity, 
their conditional decisions indicate they would not act, and the harm to the 
Type-Y would not occur. 
3. Context: Reexamining Tortfest and Deterrence 
The fourth hypothesis relates to the way the context of the tort setting 
interacts with tortfests and deterrence. To test the effect of context, we 
compare decisions to act in the neutral Context-Free frame to the Factory 
Vignette. We predict that the willingness to commit the tort will be higher in 
our Factory Vignette than in the Context-Free frame, as the Factory Vignette 
makes the social benefit from the tort (i.e., producing cement) more salient 
compared to the Context-Free frame.123 
 
 121 Note that in the pilot, the increase was observed between conditional on 0 and conditional on 1 
other subject acting. Groups only had three Type-X subjects and the payoffs were parameterized 
differently. See infra Appendix I: Pilot Results. 
 122 See infra Section II.E.4. 
 123  See Alekseev et al., supra note 71 (examining the effect of contextualized instructions in 
economic experiments); Raymond & Cason, supra note 81 (same). 
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 Unconditional decisions to act 
Table 4 reports that unconditional average proportions of willingness to 
act are higher in the Vignettes than in the Context-Free treatments. This is 
true under Liability (V–L 85.36% versus CF–L 68.25%) and under No 
Liability (V–NL 91.67% versus CF–NL 81.75%). In other words, regardless 
of the liability regime, more actors are willing to unconditionally commit a 
tort in the contextualized treatment. 
FIGURE 4: UNCONDITIONAL DECISIONS TO ACT ACROSS LIABILITY REGIMES: VIGNETTE VS. 
CONTEXT-FREE FRAMINGS 
 
The differences are also clearly observed in Figure 4, which displays 
the proportion of subjects (Type-Xs and Factories) acting unconditionally in 
each round. In Figure 4, the graph on the top displays the data for acting 
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the bottom is corresponding data for the No Liability treatments (CF–NL and 
V–NL). It is easy to see that the proportion of subjects (Type-Xs and 
Factories) acting is higher in the Vignette treatments for both liability 
treatments in every round. This contextual difference is highly statistically 
significant with Liability and weakly significant with No Liability.124 
Recall that the first hypothesis predicts reduced deterrence of tort law 
as a result of imposing liability on multiple actors, which at some point may 
even lead to higher participation in tortious activity than when actors face no 
liability. 125  The results from our contextualized unconditional decisions 
support this reduced-deterrence effect. The average proportion of subjects 
acting unconditionally in V–L (85.36%) is not significantly different than 
the average proportion in V–NL (91.67%).126 The finding that liability does 
not significantly influence unconditional willingness to act is robust across 
both our nonparametric tests and regression results in the Vignette setting. If 
anything, context appears to strengthen this reduced-deterrence effect. 
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 Conditional decisions to act 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 concern the tortfest dynamic and but-for causation. 
We examine the effect of the more realistic context in our Vignettes on these 
hypotheses by again looking to the conditional decisions that subjects made 
using the Strategy Method. 
 
 124 Nonparametric rank-sum tests report that the median difference in willingness to act across 
contextualized instructions is significant with Liability (p = 0.025, n = 76) but not with No Liability 
(p = 0.262, n = 84). However, formal multilevel logit regression analysis reported in Models 6 and 7 of 
Table 6 finds that differences between Neutral and Vignette treatments are significant at the 1% level 
with Liability (Model 6, p = 0.008) and at the 10% level with No Liability (Model 7, p = 0.075). 
 125 Supra Section II.C (“We hypothesize that the imposition of liability on multiple actors will 
incentivize an actor who would alone engage in a harmless activity to switch to a tortious activity if 
liability is imposed on a large enough number of actors.”). 
 126  This is verified in a nonparametric rank-sum test (p = 0.934, n = 88) and multilevel logit 
regression analysis reported in Model 8 of Table 6 (p = 0.453). 
 127 The full regression models are reported in Appendix II. 
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We begin by comparing conditional decisions with Liability under the 
Vignette and Context-Free treatments (i.e., CF–L versus V–L). Our results 
here appear to be robust to context. The average proportions in Table 4 for 
CF–L and V–L are all very similar and not statistically different: conditional 
on zero others (15.08% versus 12.50%); conditional on one (29.76% versus 
23.57%); conditional on two (92.06% versus 86.79%); and conditional on 
three (96.42% versus 94.64%).128 These results are confirmed by regression 
analysis reported in Table 7 below. The omitted dummy variable in each 
Model is a variable for CF–L. While the odds ratios are all less than 1, 
indicating a lower likelihood of acting in the V–L condition relative to the 
Context-Free frame, these differences are nowhere near statistical 
significance. These results are reassuring in that they suggest the tortfest 
dynamic and but-for causation effects under Liability treatment are robust to 
presentation in a more realistic context. At the level of conditional decisions, 
the more realistic Vignette treatment does not appear to lead to individuals 
being more willing to act, as we had hypothesized. However, the statistically 
significant difference in unconditional willingness to act in the Liability 
treatment perhaps suggests it is easier for actors (i.e., subjects assigned as 
Type-X or Factories) to implicitly predict others’ participation in the tortfest 
that leads to their own higher willingness to act. 



















p = 0.850 
0.52 
p = 0.632 
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p = 0.815 
 
In addition to testing the impact of context within the Liability 
treatment, we also assess the robustness of our tortfest dynamic and but-for 
causation results across liability treatments (e.g., V–L versus V–NL). Figure 
5 visually confirms that the same patterns observed in conditional decision-
making in the Context-Free treatments130 are also present in the more realistic 
Vignette treatments. Figure 5’s top graph illustrates the tortfest dynamic in 
 
 128  Nonparametric rank-sum tests (n = 84) and multilevel panel logit regressions reported in  
Models 9–12 of Table 7 confirm that the differences between conditional decisions in Context-Free and 
Vignette treatments with Liability are not statistically significant (p > 0.54 for each comparison). 
 129 The full regression models are reported in Appendix II. 
 130 The conditional decisions to act in the Context-Free treatments are described supra in Figure 3. 
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V–L, with a substantial and highly significant increase between acting 
conditional on one other to conditional on two others acting.131 
FIGURE 5: AVERAGE CONDITIONAL DECISIONS TO ACT IN VIGNETTE: LIABILITY VS. NO 
LIABILITY BY ROUND 
 
Figure 5’s bottom graph illustrates the proportion of Factories acting 
conditional on others acting under a No Liability regime. Again, as in CF–
NL, in V–NL there is a significant increase in willingness to act between 
acting alone and acting conditional on one other joining the activity (0X to 
 
 131  Comparing average conditional willingness to act across all rounds, Wilcoxon signed rank, 
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1X).132 In other words, it appears that in the contextualized No Liability 
regime, a substantial proportion of subjects are reluctant to act on their own 
to secure a gain at another’s cost. However, once joined by at least one other 
person, subjects are significantly more willing to commit the tort (91.07% 
versus 62.20%). Willingness to act alone appears higher in the Vignette–No 
Liability frame than the corresponding figure in the Context-Free frame (V–
NL versus CF–NL conditional 0X), which perhaps suggests that the benefits 
are more salient in the contextualized frame.133 
4. Tort Liability and Fairness 
Our final hypotheses relate to the way in which tort liability interacts 
with the perceived fairness of an individual’s decision to act. Our 
experimental design allows us to examine the ways in which the private costs 
and benefits of actors are balanced against fairness concerns for the potential 
victim. We do so by comparing unconditional and conditional decisions to 
act across our liability conditions. We also use subjects’ responses to the 
fairness questions. We hypothesize that tort liability can potentially blunt 
fairness concerns and may even create a tortfest dynamic in fairness 
perceptions, rather than signaling moral culpability. 
It is unclear ex ante how a liability regime may interact with subjects’ 
concerns about fairness.134 Prior studies suggest that there may be a “norm-
activation” impact that helps deter activity that imposes harms on others135 
or a deterrence aspect that arises through an expressive function of tort 
liability in declaring and denouncing behavior from a social perspective.136 
However, a more general literature supports an alternative: that subjects may 
treat the liability obligation as the “price” to engage in the activity.137 Under 
this view, liability more readily allows actors to weigh the “cost” of acting 
 
 132  Comparing average conditional willingness to act across all rounds, Wilcoxon signed rank, 
p < 0.001, n = 48). An additional robustness check is examined in Appendix II. 
 133 Comparing average willingness to act conditional upon 0X across all rounds, Wilcoxon signed 
rank, p = 0.104, n = 84. Note that this difference is at the margin of conventional statistical significance. 
 134 For discussion and empirical results in the breach-of-contract setting, see Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, 
Incentives to Breach, 17 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 290, 291 (2015). 
 135 See Deffains et al., supra note 62, at 2 (“[T]he introduction of legal liability has a norm-activation 
effect, in the sense that individuals then put greater weight on losses caused to others, which complements 
the threat of legal sanctions.”).  
 136 See Eisenberg & Engel, Unpacking Negligence Liability, supra note 45, at 134 (noting deterrent 
effects from courts that “make[] social expectations explicit” and “blame” defendants who fail to meet 
them as distinct from incentives created by pecuniary liability).  
 137 See supra notes 9495 and accompanying text. 
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against their own private benefits from acting. 138  In the case of shared 
liability and the potential for a tortfest dynamic, an additional possibility is 
that as more individuals join the tortfest, it may be perceived as less harmful 
and more socially acceptable. The existence of the liability rule may help to 
focus subjects’ attention on the shared benefits and costs of the group and 
lower psychological costs that may be associated with distributive aspects of 
the activity.139 
 Observed behavior 
One of the first points to note from our experimental results is that 
subjects are generally reluctant to act at the expense of an innocent victim if 
they are the only Type-X to benefit from the activity. This is perhaps most 
evident in the average conditional willingness to act in the scenario with No 
Liability.140 In the Context-Free frame, only 48% of Type-X subjects indicate 
willingness to act alone, although the monetary payoff—35 tokens versus 24 
tokens—is significant. In the Vignette frame, more subjects are willing to act 
alone, but 37% of subjects would not act unless accompanied by others, even 
though acting under a No Liability regime promises a gain at no monetary 
costs. 
However, once subjects are no longer acting alone, the pattern across 
liability treatments begins to diverge. In the No Liability regime, Type-X 
individuals are much more willing to act to gain the benefit at Type-Y’s 
expense. Conditional on one actor joining, the willingness to commit a tort 
jumps to 79% in the Context-Free frame and 91% in the Vignette. These 
proportions are far higher than in the treatments where Type-X’s face 
Liability: conditional on one other acting, 29% are willing to act in the 
 
 138 See, e.g., Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier & Pedro Rey-Biel, When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work 
to Modify Behavior, 25 J. ECON. PERSPS. 191, 19294 (2011) (explaining when psychological effects can 
limit the ability to incentivize behavior through the price effect); Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 94; 
Deffains & Fluet, supra note 95.  
 139 A large literature confirms that subjects often depart from behavior predicted by self-interested 
monetary payoffs in experimental settings and, instead, appear to behave in ways consistent with a degree 
of regard for the welfare of others and an aversion to inequality. See, e.g., Gary Charness & Matthew 
Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, 117 Q.J. ECON. 817, 817 (2002) (testing the 
motivations of participants in economic experimental games and finding a primary concern for social 
welfare); John A. List, On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games, 115 J. POL. ECON. 482, 482 
(2007) (providing a comprehensive study of results from dictator games and finding persistent result that 
participants do not choose the most selfish outcome); JOSEPH HENRICH, ROBERT BOYD, SAMUEL 
BOWLES, COLIN CAMERER, ERNST FEHR & HERBERT GINTIS, FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY: 
ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES 8 
(2004) (describing experimental tests carried out in a large, cross-cultural study finding no society in 
which behavior was consistent with pure self-interest).  
 140 See supra Table 4. 
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Context-Free frame with Liability and 23% in the Vignette. 141  These 
differences are strongly statistically significant.142 
However, once two other subjects are acting, the proportions of those 
who are willing to act on average converge across liability treatments. In the 
Context-Free frame, 92% act with Liability versus 87% with No Liability. In 
the Vignette frame, the corresponding proportions are 86% for both 
treatments. There is no statistically significant difference across liability 
regimes once three actors are involved. Interestingly, conditional on three 
actors joining, the share of actors willing to act becomes higher in the 
Liability regime, rising in the CF–L to 96%, compared to 88% in the CF–
NL, and in the V–L 94%, compared to 87% in the V–NL.143 By contrast, 
there is virtually no change in the No Liability conditions: 88% in the CF–
NL compared to 87% in V–NL. 
These differences at the higher levels of expected actors’ participation 
imply that tort liability may be incentivizing participation in the harmful 
activity by reducing the monetary cost to the actors and also by mitigating 
fairness concerns. Behavior in the No Liability treatments appears consistent 
with subjects generally being willing to act for private gain with a loss to the 
victim—so long as they are not solely responsible.144 However, actors seem 
perhaps less willing to participate in some situations where they benefit and 
another is harmed without redress than in the case where liability provides 
compensation to the victim.145 Compensation to the victim potentially helps 
the actors focus on the collective benefits and dilutes moral culpability from 
acting as more participants join in the tort. 
 
 141 See supra Table 4. 
 142 Testing for equivalence across liability treatments in the Context-Free frame, we reject with 
p < 0.0001, n = 72, and in the Vignette frame p < 0.0001, n = 88. 
 143 See supra Table 4. While the higher average willingness to act in the Liability treatments is not 
generally significant, the results approach significance in the Context-Free frame. Testing for equivalence 
between CF–L and CF–NL conditional on the others acting can be rejected, but only weakly, as 
p = 0.1050, n = 72. 
 144  This is consistent with finding conduct more morally and legally culpable when an actor 
intentionally inflicts harm on a victim as opposed to exposing her to a risk of harm. See, for example, the 
discussion in Eisenberg & Engel, Unpacking Negligence Liability, supra note 45, at 117, stating, “In light 
of prevalent moral intuitions, knowingly imposing harm on an innocent outsider is not the same as 
exposing this outsider to the risk of suffering harm.” It also reflects theories that ascribe greater 
blameworthiness as individuals become more directly and consciously responsible for causing harm. See 
Alicke, supra note 37, at 563 (assessing blameworthiness based on various dimensions of control; control 
is highest “when the actor purposely (volitional behavior control) and with foresight (volitional outcome 
control) causes harmful consequences (causal control)”). 
 145 Eisenberg & Engel, Unpacking Negligence Liability, supra note 45, at 137 (discussing their 
findings suggesting that provision of compensation “crowded out” moral concerns related to tortiously 
harming a victim). 
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 Fairness attitudes 
These intuitions appear to be consistent with results from the fairness 
questions. In this set of questions administered following the seventh round 
in each session, we asked subjects to rate the fairness when one, two, three, 
and four actors act. Subjects were asked to assess overall fairness and also 
asked to assess the fairness to the those who acted, the victim, and for all five 
subjects—i.e., the four Type-Xs and the Type-Y in the Context-Free frame 
and the four Factories and Owner in the Vignette. We used a scale from 0 to 
5, 5 five being “completely fair,” allowing us to assess fairness both within 
and across liability treatments. 
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Figure 6 displays the average fairness rating to the actors, the victim, 
and the entire group. Within each of the three graphs, there are average 
fairness points for each possible scenario: one subject acting, two subjects, 
three subjects, and all four subjects in the group acting. To increase the 
questionnaire’s statistical power, data are pooled by liability regime. For 
instance, the blue line in each of Figure 6’s graphs illustrate the average 
fairness ratings trend for subjects in CF–NL and V–NL together. 
Importantly, these average fairness ratings only contain responses from 
subjects assigned as actors, as we are particularly interested in the responses 
of subjects who made the decision whether or not to act. 
The top graph in Figure 6 displays the average fairness rating to the 
actors. With No Liability, the fairness ratings are relatively stable as the 
number of actors increases. By contrast, with Liability there is a clear upward 
trend. Comparing fairness with one acting to fairness with four acting, the 
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. 146  The trend is so 
pronounced that, while the average fairness rating when one subject acts is 
significantly higher with No Liability, the average fairness rating when four 
subjects act is significantly higher with Liability.147 This marked rise in the 
perceived fairness of the activity under the Liability regime is consistent with 
tort liability acting to facilitate rather than deter the activity (by lowering the 
psychological costs that may be associated with acting alone to cause harm 
or benefiting at the expense of a single victim).148 
The middle graph in Figure 6 displays the average fairness rating to the 
victim. The clearest observation from this graph is the large difference 
between the liability regimes in every scenario. Comparing average fairness 
ratings across liability regimes, fairness is higher with Liability than with No 
Liability and is significant in every case.149 Also note that, since 2.5 is the 
middle of the fairness rating range, actors always felt that acting was unfair 
to the victim with No Liability, regardless of the number of acting subjects. 
By contrast, Liability works the other way. In the Liability regime, actors 
always felt, on average, that engaging in the harmful activity was fair to the 
 
 146  This is a nonparametric signed-rank test, p = 0.028, n = 6. Each session is treated as an 
independent observation. The small sample sizes for the tests of fairness are the conservative approach to 
controlling for subjects’ interactions during the experiment. Recall that with Strangers Matching during 
the experiment, subjects were randomly rematched with others in the same session. This leads to 
alternative approaches to control for such independence. The least conservative approach would be to 
treat each subject as an independent observation. Appendix II provides a discussion of these approaches. 
 147 This is a nonparametric rank sum, p = 0.025 and 0.005, respectively, n = 12.  
 148 See supra notes 9498, 135139 and accompanying text for discussion of the theories behind 
psychological costs. 
 149 This is a nonparametric rank sum, p < 0.004 in each case, n = 12. 
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victim. However, comparing the case with one subject acting to the case with 
four acting, the fairness ratings significantly increase with No Liability but 
not with Liability.150 
The bottom graph in Figure 6 displays the average fairness ratings to 
the entire group—a proxy for “society.” This graph presents a clear pattern 
of fairness ratings: in each liability regime, fairness significantly increases 
as the number of actors increases.151 The other apparent pattern is that, in 
every case, average fairness ratings are greater with Liability than with No 
Liability regimes. 
To summarize, we observe the tortfest dynamic in the fairness ratings 
to the entire group—a result we did not expect. Although there is a level 
effect when it comes to the liability regime, fairness ratings to the entire 
group are consistently and significantly higher with Liability than with No 
Liability. It is also interesting to point out that with No Liability, fairness 
ratings to the entire group start out slightly unfair (2.33) and end in the fair 
portion of the scale (3.35). 
5. Regression Results with Controls 
In the previous Sections we reported multilevel logit regression 
analyses examining treatment differences in individuals’ decisions to act or 
not. In these regressions, the independent variables were treatment dummy 
variables and a time trend, which controlled for the round of the session in 
which the observations were generated. In addition to these regressions, we 
ran several models using additional demographic and other controls. These 
additional controls include: (1) measures of subjects’ risk proclivity, (2) the 
number of previous economics experiments that the subjects have 
participated in, (3) a male dummy variable,152 (4) a dummy variable for a 
subject with a business major, (5) a dummy variable for a subject who is 
white, (6) a dummy variable for a subject who self-reports to be a believer 
in any supernatural being, (7) dummy variables for whether a subject is a 
Democrat or Republican (independent is the omitted dummy), and (8) a 
subject’s political-party intensity (0 to 5, 5 being very intense). The 
regression models with these additional controls pooled individuals’ 
observations across liability treatments and used dummies for contextualized 
instructions. 153  As mentioned in Appendix II, we incorporated random 
 
 150 This is a nonparametric signed rank, p = 0.046 and 0.600, respectively, n = 6. 
 151 This is a nonparametric signed rank, p = 0.028 for each liability regime, n = 6. 
 152 Subjects could identify as male, female, transgender, or other. 
 153 The individual data are panels, with seven observations for each individual subject for each round 
in the session. 
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effects at the individual and session levels. We also included a round variable 
to control for any time trend (e.g., learning).154 
Regarding the differences between Context-Free and Vignette 
treatments, the results reported earlier are qualitatively confirmed in 
regressions with these additional controls. We find a significantly higher 
likelihood to act unconditionally in Vignette treatments than in Context-Free 
treatments with both Liability and No Liability regimes.155 Decisions to act 
conditional on zero or one other actor are significantly more likely to occur 
in the Vignette treatment with No Liability. However, the Vignette treatment 
does not lead to statistically different likelihoods to act conditional on two 
or three other subjects acting. With Liability, the likelihood of acting does 
not change with the Vignette compared with the Context-Free instructions in 
any of the four conditional decisions. 
Although we include a variety of controls, in general, these are not 
systematically significant in our regressions. This is somewhat reassuring, as 
it suggests that our results are not driven by particular characteristics of our 
sample. 
CONCLUSION 
The use of group causation theories such as substantial factor, concerted 
action, and alternative liability is assumed to deter potential injurers and 
prevent harm to victims. However, to date, the discourse regarding the 
deterrent effect of group causation theories has been based on intuition and 
conjecture. This discourse has not been attentive enough to the potential that 
liability will incentivize tortious activity. It has also lacked the critical 
support that empirical evidence provides. In this Article, we undertake to fill 
this gap by testing, for the first time, the effect of causation law on group 
wrongdoing. Using an incentivized experiment in a lab setting, we tested 
different liability regimes in both contextualized and neutral framings. Our 
analysis of over 1,200 data points from 200 subjects confirms that group 
causation doctrines, such as substantial factor and concerted action, can 
encourage, rather than discourage, actors to engage in tortious activities. 
In the Liability regime, we observed a clear tortfest dynamic. In the 
Context-Free framing, the willingness to engage in the tortious activity 
increased with the number of tortfeasors from 15% (acting alone), to 29% 
(joined by one other), to 92% (with two others), to 96% (with three others). 
We observed the same dynamic in the Vignette framing: willingness to 
 
 154 These regressions are reported in Appendix II. 
 155 With a Liability regime, the likelihood of acting is significantly higher in the Vignette treatment 
than the Context-Free treatment (p = 0.034). Similarly, with a No Liability regime, the likelihood of 
acting is higher in the Vignette treatment (p = 0.020). 
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behave tortiously increased with the number of actors from 12% to 23% to 
86% to 94%. These jumps were statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
sum, despite—in fact, because of—the imposition of liability, the tortious 
activity became more beneficial and the pressure to join the activity grew 
stronger as more actors joined. 
An analysis of the unconditional decisions to act in the liability regimes 
reveals that actors were also willing to take a “leap of faith.” Although acting 
tortiously was worthwhile only if an acting subject was joined by two others, 
the high willingness to act unconditionally—68% in the Context-Free 
framing and 85% in the Vignette framing—implies that actors believed or 
expected that others would choose to behave tortiously as well. The results 
also reveal that actors were more willing to behave tortiously, and 
unconditionally so, in the polluting-factories Vignette than in the Context-
Free framing. One possible explanation is that in the contextualized framing, 
the costs to the victim and the benefits from the tortious activity are more 
salient. Consequently, actors may more easily see that they can reap a private 
gain and increase total welfare at a cost to a compensated victim. The result 
is similar to the one observed in a potential Pareto Public Good experiment.156 
In addition to evidence of the financial incentives from a tortfest, our 
results show that tort law can also blunt fairness concerns about acting in a 
way that harms others. Under the liability regimes, participants experienced 
the analog to a tortfest in their perceptions of fairness to the group. Just like 
the willingness to engage in a tortious activity, the level of perceived fairness 
to the group increased monotonically with the number of acting subjects.157 
In other words, participants viewed the tortfest as more fair as the number of 
tortfeasors increased. 
Moreover, under both framings, more actors were willing to engage in 
the tortious activity under Liability as compared to No Liability, conditional 
on being a part of a group of four tortfeasors (96% versus 88% in the 
Context-Free frame and 94% versus 87% in the Vignettes). While some of 
the results are only weakly significant, they suggest that the imposition of 
liability did not discourage actors and may have even done the opposite. This 
result initially may seem counterintuitive, but we offer a number of possible 
 
 156 See Dekel et al., supra note 117, at 8789 (finding that when the public good harms a minority, 
group members reduce their contributions unless group members can communicate with each and send 
monetary transfer to the harmed minority). 
 157 This is also apparent in the consistently high proportion of individuals who are conditionally 
unwilling to act alone to cause harm to the Type-Y subjects, even when they do not face liability. The 
social dimension to fairness perceptions is also apparent in our No Liability treatment. Fairness 
perceptions in this variant also increase as more participants join the harmful activity. This is important 
because it suggests that there may even be potential for a synergistic effect: shared liability creates 
financial incentives for tortfests that may also transform perceptions of fairness. 
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explanations: A Liability regime may crowd out social norms and impose 
what may be perceived as a “price” that is discounted with the number of 
acting subjects. This discounted price may also suggest a low moral 
culpability. The tortious activity may even be justified by a “mob 
mentality”—an everyone-does-it rationale. It could also be viewed as 
morally acceptable when the activity produces a product from which society 
benefits, notwithstanding the harm to the (compensated) individual victim. 
We also find clear evidence supporting the but-for test’s applicability 
in the Liability regime. Very few actors chose to act by themselves or with 
another (15% and 29% in the Context-Free treatment and 12% and 23% in 
the Vignette). However, consistent with the theory, the willingness to engage 
in the tortious activity jumped significantly conditional on two others joining 
them—when the tortious activity became profitable—increasing to 92% in 
the Context-Free framing and 86% in the Vignette. This willingness reached 
a whopping 96% in the Context-Free framing and 94% in the Vignette group 
of four actors. The jump from acting with one other to acting with two others 
(29% to 92% in the Context-Free frame and 23% to 86% in the Vignette) is 
substantial and statistically significant at the 1% level. It supports the 
conclusion that, consistent with the theory, the large majority of subjects 
(71% in the Context-Free frame and 77% in the Vignette frame) would not 
engage in the tortious activity but for two or more joining them. Formal 
regression analysis supports these results. 
Our study also makes several important contributions to the prior 
economic and empirical literature. Previous studies focused on liability’s 
effect on a single tortfeasor, but they could not observe decisions at the 
individual level. Previous studies also could not test how imposing liability 
on many actors impacts the members of the group. By contrast, our unique 
design allowed us to directly test the effect of causation law in cases 
involving multiple actors. We were also able to observe individuals’ 
decisions, including whether and to what extent they are dependent on the 
actions of others. 
Still, a key question for any experimental study in a laboratory setting 
is how relevant it may be in the “real world.”158 Does our experimental study 
 
 158 A natural question when using laboratory experiments with student samples is whether behavior 
observed in student samples is generalizable to the behavior of the population. Professor Vernon Smith 
argues that a major benefit of controlled experiments is their internal validity based on “induced” 
institutions and environments. See Vernon L. Smith, Economics in the Laboratory, 8 J. ECON. PERSPS. 
113, 113 (1994). However, Professors Steven Levitt and John List question the external validity of 
experiments to settings in the field. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, What Do Laboratory Experiments 
Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?, 21 J. ECON. PERSPS. 153, 154 (2007). 
Professor Colin Camerer critiques the arguments in Levitt and List. Colin F. Camerer, The Promise and 
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reflect insights important in the practical world of tort law? While there are 
some features of our experimental design that may suggest caution in 
extending our findings, we believe that the basic incentive structure 
underlying our experiment potentially applies in numerous settings where 
causation law creates the potential for shared liability. One such common 
setting is medical malpractice cases where multiple actors may be 
responsible for an indivisible harm to the victim. For example, doctors and 
nurses performing a surgery using tools manufactured and produced by third 
parties might cause an indivisible harm to the patient. Other settings, more 
closely aligned with our experiment, could include environmental harms, 
such as decisions about whether or not to properly dispose of potential 
contaminants. For example, multiple industry participants may contribute to 
groundwater contamination. Extending liability to catch all the contributing 
parties may instead lead to a dilution of costs that can incentivize the 
behavior.159 
We end with a call for additional research. The use of an experimental 
methodology necessarily imposes some limitations in order to preserve 
internal validity and the ability to draw causal conclusions. In our 
experiment, we have focused on a setting with a loss that can be clearly 
monetized. However, many tort disputes involve personal injuries, not just 
injuries to property. In these settings, victims’ losses are more difficult to 
quantify, and actors may also experience higher nonpecuniary costs in 
addition to tort liability, whether moral, psychological, or social-norm based. 
Accordingly, some care would be required in extending our results to the 
context of personal harms. This area would be an important future extension 
of our current work. However, our experiment provides evidence that shared 
liability can support but-for causation and create incentives for tortfests that 
seriously weaken the disincentive effects of tort law. Our results caution 




Success of Lab-Field Generalizability in Experimental Economics: A Critical Reply to Levitt and List, in 
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY 249, 252 (Guillaume R. Fréchette & Andrew 
Schotter eds., 2015). For instance, while lab experiments may not extend to a particular field setting, they 
do further scientific knowledge by increasing understanding of the general way people respond to 
incentives captured in the lab. See id. Numerous lab experiments find behavior consistent with that 
observed in the real world. See, e.g., James Alm, Kim M. Bloomquist & Michael McKee, On the External 
Validity of Laboratory Tax Compliance Experiments, 53 ECON. INQUIRY 1170, 1171 (2015) (finding that 
tax-compliance behavior observed in the lab is similar to that observed in the real world). 
 159 See J. Shahar Dillbary, The Case Against Collective Liability, 62 B.C. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 
2021) (showing how in the medical context, doctors and nurses may combine and engage in defensive 
and offensive practices). 
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APPENDIX I: PILOT RESULTS 
The pilot involved two CF–L sessions and two CF–NL sessions. Each 
session had seven rounds and sixteen subjects, for a total of sixty-four 
subjects, as summarized in Table AI-1. 














1 Type-Y  
None 2 32 
 
As explained in Section II.D, a limitation of the pilot results is that the 
smaller group size and payoff incentives, combined with the use of the 
Strategy Method, created a dominant strategy for unconditional action in the 
Liability treatment. In the pilot’s decision environment, the initial 
endowment from not acting was 18 tokens, and the return from acting was 
30 tokens. As a result, each Type-X subject was better off acting conditional 
on at least one other Type-X subject acting (30 – (18/2) > 18).160 Knowing 
that the other Type-X subjects had a dominant strategy to act conditional on 
one other Type-X subject acting, Type-X subjects also had a dominant 
strategy to act in their unconditional decision, even in the simultaneous 
decision environment.161 As explained in detail above, the treatments in the 
full experiment were modified (by increasing the number of actors from 
three to four) to avoid the creation of a dominant strategy in the Liability 
treatment.162 However, this “limitation” turned out to be a benefit, since we 
were able to compare two liability regimes where actors had a dominant 
strategy to act. 
 
 160 With two Type-X subjects equally splitting the 18-token compensation to the Type-Y subject, 
each Type-X subject is promised a payoff of 21 tokens (30 – 18/2)—a higher payoff compared to the 18 
tokens from not acting. 
 161 To see why, and without limitation, consider X1’s conditional response. If X1’s Action Table 
indicated that she would not act under any circumstances, the Type-X subject will not act and thus expects 
a gain of $18. If X1’s Action Table indicated that she would act if one other actor would, the activity will 
take place only if another Type-X subject acts. In such a case, X1 can expect 21 tokens, which is higher 
compared to not acting (21 > 18). Thus, X1’s best strategy is to act conditional on one other acting. The 
same is true for all other Type-X subjects. Knowing this, all Type-X subjects would choose to act in their 
unconditional decision. 
 162 See supra Section II.D.  
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While the pilot lacks sufficient power for conducting formal statistical 
tests, we can examine summary statistics and trends observed in these 
sessions to see if they are broadly consistent with our hypotheses.163 
Table AI-2 reports the proportion of rounds where Type-X subjects 
chose to act, averaged across all seven rounds. The values in parentheses are 
the standard deviations of average proportions across Type-X subjects. The 
larger the standard deviation, the more heterogeneity exists in the data. For 
instance, the average proportion of rounds where a Type-X subject chose to 
act unconditionally in CF–L is 91%. While perhaps not surprising given the 
dominant strategy to act unconditionally, this result indicates that subjects 
understand and are responding to the incentive scheme. In comparison, 
subjects chose to act unconditionally in the CF–NL in over 80% of the 
rounds on average. The fact that subjects chose to act less often in CF–NL is 
surprising, given that acting when there is No Liability is a clear dominant 
strategy—in fact, a much clearer dominant strategy than in CF–L. The results 
may indicate Type-X subjects’ other-regarding preferences, 164  such as 
kindness or guilt for the Type-Y subject who was left with zero tokens when 
one Type-X subject acted. This is also supported by the average 
unconditional acting of the two treatments in Figure AI-1. The average 
proportion of subjects acting across all Type-X subjects is lower in all CF–
NL rounds compared to CF–L rounds. 
 
 163 Statistical power is the probability a hypothesis test limits Type II errors or false negative errors. 
That is, stronger power implies a higher chance of rejecting the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis 
is in fact false. 
 164  An individual with “other-regarding preferences” is different than one with “self-regarding 
preferences” in that she also considers other individuals’ utility or consumption levels. For example, 
someone with altruistic other-regarding preferences may prefer a situation in which others consume or 
have more wealth, whereas the envious would prefer that others do worse. 
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TABLE AI-2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ACROSS ALL ROUNDS IN PILOT165 
 CF–L 
N = 24 
CF–NL 
N = 24 





   
Conditional Decision to Act Upon:   















FIGURE AI-1: AVERAGE UNCONDITIONAL DECISIONS IN PILOT 
 
Table AI-2 reports average conditional choices to act using the Strategy 
Method. In CF–L, about 12% of subjects chose to act conditional on no other 
Type-X subjects acting. It is not clear why a Type-X subject would choose 
to act in this situation. This result may indicate a small amount of confusion 
on the part of the subjects while filling out the Action Table. Over 95% of 
subjects chose to act conditional on one other Type-X subject acting, and 
over 99% chose to act conditional on two other Type-X subjects acting. 
 
 165 Proportion of Type-X subjects who decided to act, averaged across all seven rounds. Values in 
parentheses are standard deviations across Type-X subjects’ average decisions to act. The total number 
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Taken together, these results indicate that subjects’ willingness to act 
increases with the number of others choosing to act. These findings support 
our hypotheses and, for the most part, are consistent with the main 
experiment. 
In CF–NL, about 50% of Type-X subjects indicate a willingness to act 
if they are the only Type-X subject acting. The proportion of Type-X 
subjects choosing to act surges to 88% or more when there is at least one 
other Type-X subject acting—a trend similar to what we observed in the 
main analysis. 166  This jump occurs despite no change in the monetary 
incentives across conditional decisions to act in this treatment. This is 
another instance where it appears that subjects are responding to monetary 
incentives but not as strongly as one may predict. Subjects may be either 
self-regarding with a predilection for conforming, or they may have other-
regarding preferences, or both. 
Compared to CF–L, in CF–NL, more subjects are willing to act 
conditional on no other Type-X subjects acting—that is, conditional on 
acting alone. However, conditional on one or two other Type-X subjects 
acting, when it is a dominant strategy to act under Liability, there is less 
acting with No Liability. This is illustrated in Figure AI-2, which reports the 
average proportion of subjects acting in each conditional decision described. 
These pilot results are consistent with a deterrent effect for liability that 
switches to an incentive to act once multiple subjects are sharing the costs of 
providing compensation. 
 
 166 See supra Table 4. 
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Decision to Act: Conditional-2X-Pilot
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The consistency and stability of the pilot results are further supported 
by the fairness feedback, gathered from subjects’ direct responses to the post-
experiment questions, as depicted in Figure AI-3. Subjects were asked to 
rank on a scale from 0 to 5 the fairness of Type-X subjects acting as a 
function of the number of actors, with 0 being unfair and 5 being completely 
fair. The results show that under both CF–NL and CF–L, fairness levels were 
always above the 2.5 median, that is, the (tortious) activity was considered 
more fair than unfair. Moreover, under both liability regimes, fairness levels 
monotonically increased with the number of actors. In other words, subjects 
in CF–NL seemed to have thought that when three actors inflict an 
indivisible harm on the Type-Y subject, the result is fairer than two actors 
doing the same, which is still fairer than one actor solely inflicting the harm. 
However, compared to the CF–NL, under CF–L, acting was perceived as 
fairer when two or three Type-X subjects act. 
FIGURE AI-3: FAIRNESS OF ACTION AS A FUNCTION OF THE NUMBER OF ACTORS IN PILOT 
 
In summary, the pilot results indicate that subjects generally understood 
the nature of the experiment, instructions, and procedure. The Liability 
manipulation appears to influence subjects’ behavior in a way that is 
generally consistent with our design and expectations. Results seem to 
support our main hypotheses. Subjects were willing to act more often under 
Liability compared to No Liability, despite having a dominant strategy to act 
in both treatments, suggesting that shared liability may reduce deterrence 
(Hypothesis 1). It also appears that subjects were more willing to participate 
in the tortious activity as the number of actors increased, indicating a tortfest 
dynamic (Hypothesis 2). Finally, the results support the claim that the but-
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more willing to act in the tort conditional on others acting—as our theory 
predicts. 
APPENDIX II: DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN RESULTS 
This Appendix provides a more detailed description of the statistical 
analysis reported above. Table AII-1 below is a more comprehensive version 
of Table 5 in Section II.E.1 and reports more results of our mixed-effect logit 
regressions. The multilevel model used in these regressions has 
(1) individual-level random effects to control for correlations between an 
individual’s decisions over time, as well as (2) session-level random effects 
to control for correlations between subjects who are randomly rematched 
within a session by Strangers Matching.167 Table AII-1 reports an additional 
variable (not reported in Table 5) called Round. Because each subject 
participated in seven decision rounds, we test if and in what way a subject’s 
behavior changed over time. The concern is that subjects might be learning 
about the incentives of the experiment from one round to another and that 
this learning effect may drive some of the results. If so, we would expect to 
see Round significantly affecting the decision to act. However, Round is 
insignificant in each model, so we can conclude that subjects have a good 
understanding of the incentives of the experiment in Round 1. Their 
decisions to act do not change over time. 
























p = 0.066 
0.01*** 
(0.01) 
p < 0.001 
 < 0.01*** 
( < 0.00) 
p < 0.001 
1.41 
(1.19) 
p = 0.685 
6.01 
(7.67) 
p = 0.160 
Round 
1.08 (0.08) 
p = 0.299 
1.13 (0.09) 
p = 0.122 
0.08 (0.10) 
p = 0.387 
1.02 (0.10) 
p = 0.849 
0.86 (0.10) 
p = 0.184 
 
We performed some additional variations in our regression analysis to 
confirm the robustness of the main results reported in Table 5.169 Our analysis 
and results are not qualitatively or statistically altered if we include a lagged 
 
 167 See, e.g., PETER G. MOFFATT, EXPERIMETRICS: ECONOMETRICS FOR EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
92 (2016) (controlling for potential session-effects and correlation of individuals’ contributions in 
repeated periods); Guillaume R. Fréchette, Session-Effects in the Laboratory, 15 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 
485 (2012). 
 168 Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1–5: random effects at the individual and session level. 
n = 504. The omitted dummy variable is CF–NL. 
 169 See supra Section II.E.1.a. 
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decision to act as an independent variable, which is another way of testing 
for dependence in the decisions to act that could influence the results. We 
also use an alternative estimation strategy: a mixed-effects linear panel 
regression model. The structure of the logit model we use for our main results 
is a better fit for the nature of our decision because it corresponds well with 
the binary choice to act (1) or not (0). However, the linear model is a possible 
alternative estimation strategy. We use this strategy for Model 3 (1X), 
because our mixed-effects logit Model 3 did not converge. We continue to 
control for random effects at the individual level (in case individual specific 
effects influenced the results). Again, our qualitative and statistical results 
remained robust. 
The analysis in Section II.E.2 looks for statistically significant effects 
of variation in our liability treatments—Liability versus No Liability—
across subjects’ conditional decisions. In order to use a panel-regression 
approach, individuals can only make one decision in each Round. It is not 
possible to use a panel-regression approach to simultaneously capture all 
four conditional decisions in each Round as a common function of the 
Liability regime and our other controls. Instead, our main results are based 
on nonparametric tests for conditional decisions averaged across all Rounds. 
Below, we also report results based on nonparametric tests examining 
individual decisions from the Round 1 only, as a robustness check. 
Individual decisions are statistically independent in Round 1 because 
subjects have not yet received feedback on others’ decisions. These 
nonparametric tests eliminate one of the dependencies that would otherwise 
be controlled for in panel regressions. 170  This observation implies that 
decisions in Round 1 describe behavior fairly closely to when decisions 
across all rounds are averaged. The results confirm those reported and 
discussed in Section II.E.2.171 
The analysis in Section II.E.3 involves comparison of results across the 
Context-Free and Vignette frames. Table AII-2 below reports expanded 
results for our mixed-effect logit regressions on unconditional decisions to 
act in these two treatments. Model 6 compares V–L to CF–L, Model 7 
 
 170 Also, as seen in Figure 3 in Section II.E.2, on average, subjects’ decisions are relatively stable 
over time. 
 171 With regard to the CF–L treatment: Signed-rank tests, Round 1 shows a statistically significant 
difference between decisions in Cond-1X and Cond-2X (Cond-0X versus Cond-1X, p = 0.103; Cond-1X 
versus Cond-2X, p < 0.001 (this is the same highly significant jump at the point where shared liability 
makes the tort monetarily attractive); Cond-2X versus Cond-3X, p = 0.103, n = 36). With regard to the 
CF–NL treatment: Signed-rank tests, round 1 shows a statistically significant difference between 
decisions in Cond-0X and Cond-1X (Cond-0X versus Cond-1X, p = 0.005 (this is the highly statistically 
significant unwillingness to act alone even when there is no liability); Cond-1X versus Cond-2X, 
p < 0.103; Cond-2X versus Cond-3X, p > 0.999, n = 36). 
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compares V–NL to CF–NL, and Model 8 compares V–NL to V–L. Recall 
that the Round dummy variable captures any change in willingness to act as 
individuals complete subsequent rounds of the experiment. The Round 
dummy variable is greater than 1 in Models 6through 8 and significant in 
Models 7 and 8. This indicates that subjects are becoming more willing to 
act unconditionally as the experiment progresses. It appears this is 
particularly true for V–NL (as Round is insignificant in Model 6 with V–L).  















p = 0.008 
— 
0.65 (0.38) 









p = 0.306 
1.17 (0.09) 
p = 0.030 
1.20 (0.10) 
p = 0.027 
 
In Section II.E.3, we also discuss the Vignette treatment’s impact on 
conditional willingness to act—that is, we compare V–L to CF–L. Table AII-
3 provides expanded results for Models 9 through 12 (the four conditional 
decisions) in Table 7. These results are the analog to those for the Context-
Free frame in Table 5 and Table AII-1. The Round variable is not significant 
in any Model, implying subjects’ conditional decisions are relatively stable 
over decision rounds. 
  
 
 172 Standard errors in parentheses. Random effects at the individual and session level.  
Model 6: sessions = 6, subjects = 76, n = 532. Omitted dummy variable: CF–L.  
Model 7: sessions = 6, subjects = 84, n = 588. Omitted dummy variable: CF–NL.  
Model 8: sessions = 6, subjects = 88, n = 616. Omitted dummy variable: V–NL. 
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p = 0.850 
0.52 (0.71) 
p = 0.632 
0.60 (0.50) 
p = 0.547 
0.74 (0.96) 
p = 0.815 
Round 
0.91 (0.10) 
p = 0.378 
1.18 (0.13) 
p = 0.140 
1.05 (0.10) 
p = 0.636 
0.85 (0.12) 
p = 0.269 
 
As noted above, it is not possible to use a panel data approach to 
simultaneously capture the impact of varying the Vignette–Liability 
treatment across all four conditional decisions in each Round. We generate 
results for this discussion in Section II.E.3 by using the same nonparametric 
approach discussed above for the Context-Free frame. Critical robustness 
checks include: V–L willingness to act is significantly higher conditional on 
2X than 1X acting (Wilcoxon signed-rank test using only Round 1 data, 
p < 0.001, n = 40); V–NL willingness to act is significantly higher 
conditional on 1X acting than 0X (Wilcoxon signed-rank test using only 
Round 1 data, p < 0.001, n = 48). 
Section II.E.4 discusses our fairness-rating results, both across liability 
treatments and as the number of Type-X acting increased. We use individual-
level fairness rankings to conduct our nonparametric statistical analysis. 
Recall that our experimental procedure used Strangers Matching to randomly 
rematch individuals in each round. The most conservative approach to 
statistically test for fairness ratings would have been to focus on session-
level measures. This approach would fully control for statistical dependency 
between subjects within a session but would generate only six observations 
per liability treatment. We believe our less conservative approach is 
reasonable with Strangers Matching, but as we do not have a full robustness 
check for this type of dependency, this remains a caveat to our fairness rating 
results. Such a caveat is not required for the primary analysis of the decision 
to act.174 
 
 173 Standard errors in parentheses. Models 9–12: random effects at the individual and session level. 
n = 532. Omitted dummy variable is CF–L. 
 174 Robustness checks on the analysis of the decision to act are possible because subjects made 
decisions to act across seven rounds. Thus, where possible, we also used panel regressions examining the 
decisions to act that control for individual-level and session-level dependencies as robustness checks for 
the individual-level nonparametric tests. In instances where panel regressions were not possible, 
nonparametric tests were conducted using only Round 1 data, as subjects were statistically independent 
at that point in the experiment. 
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TABLE AII-4: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR RISK AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS175 
Risk and Demographic 
Controls 
No Liability 
N = 82176 
Liability 
N = 75 
Economic Experiments 1.09 (1.39) 1.48 (1.82) 
Risk Intensity 4.71 (1.88) 4.46 (1.53) 
Male Dummy 0.402 (33/82) 0.480 (36/75) 
Business-Major 
Dummy 
0.365 (30/82) 0.506 (38/75) 
White Dummy 0.804 (66/82) 0.733 (55/75) 
Believers Dummy 0.512 (42/82) 0.613 (46/75) 
Democrat Dummy 0.292 (24/82) 0.213 (16/75) 
Republican Dummy 0.231 (19/82) 0.226 (17/75) 
Political-Party 
Intensity (out of 5) 
2.24 (1.28) 2.00 (1.36) 
 
In addition to the core individual-choice and fairness-perception data 
that we analyze in the paper, we also collected information about a number 
of additional variables for our participants. Table AII-4 above reports the 
summary statistics for the variables used as additional controls in the 
regression analysis discussed in Section II.E.5. These additional controls 
generally had no statistically significant impact on our results. To illustrate, 
Table AII-5 provides results for unconditional decisions—Vignette and 
Context-Free combined—using the multilevel logit regression analysis with 
our additional controls. Results from additional regressions and analysis 
integrating these controls were also generally insignificant and revealed no 
systematic impact from these controls on our results. 
  
 
 175 The summary statistic for Economic Experiments is the average number of other economics 
experiments subjects have previously participated in. The summary statistic for Risk Intensity is average 
risk intensity on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being extremely risk-seeking and 10 being extremely risk 
averse. The summary statistics for dummies are the percentages of subjects who responded affirmatively 
to those categories. 
 176 Due to the small number of observations, transgender subjects were dropped for this analysis 
(three subjects, twenty-one observations). Statistical inferences from only three subjects are problematic. 
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(1.90) p = 0.020 
6.28** 
(5.44) p = 0.034 
# Other Economic Experiments 
1.02 
(0.19) p = 0.919 
0.73 




(0.17) p = 0.295 
0.98 
(0.26) p = 0.943 
Male Dummy 
2.45 
(1.46) p = 0.130 
0.33 
(0.30) p = 0.228 
Business-Major Dummy 
0.42 
(0.25) p = 0.149 
3.95 
(4.01) p = 0.176 
White Dummy 
0.55 
(0.37) p = 0.380 
4.61 
(4.51) p = 0.119 
Believers Dummy 
1.08 
(0.57) p = 0.886 
4.22 
(3.90) p = 0.118 
Democrat Dummy 
0.55 
(0.33) p = 0.321 
0.83 
(0.89) p = 0.862 
Republican Dummy 
3.14 
(2.40) p = 0.135 
0.38 




(0.22) p = 0.859 
1.06 
(0.33) p = 0.857 
Round 
1.21 
(0.09) p = 0.0.016 
1.08 
(0.09) p = 0.374 
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TABLE AII-6: SUBJECT-POOL CHARACTERISTICS 
Characteristic Out of 200 subjects 
Previous Economics Experiments 1.215 
Risk Intensity (010) 4.545 
Males 84 (3 transgender/other) 





Political-Party Intensity (05) 2.33 
Age 22.025 
 
 
 
